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INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation,1 the nation has struggled, often against great resistance and with
mixed results, 2 to rid itself of the scourge of segregation and its effects.
Numerous lawsuits3 ensued, as the progeny of Brown, in an effort to rec-
ognize and realize the maxim that "[s]eparate educational facilities are
inherently unequal."' This article will address the use of parental school
choice to create a more racially balanced environment.
In response to the problems of de jure segregation, s and often under
the behest and supervision of district court judges, states and school dis-
tricts across the nation created policies to racially balance schools'
populations as a means to achieve equal educational opportunity. The
concept of parental school choice was one mechanism introduced during
this period to effect that change.6 Through parental school choice pro-
grams, including magnet schools7 and other intra- and inter-district
transfer programs, schools attempted to entice parents to voluntarily enroll
their children in targeted schools in order to create more racially balanced
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the "separate but equal" doctrine established in
Plessy v. Ferguson had no place in the field of public education).
2. See RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (Herbert Hill & James E.
Jones,Jr. eds., 1993) (discussing Brown's legacy).
3. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S.
189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v.
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
4. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
5. Dejure segregation is "segregation that is permitted by law," while defacto segrega-
tion is "segregation that occurs without state authority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1362
(7th ed. 1999).
6. MARY HAYWOOD METz, DIF Er.ENT By DESIGN: THE CONTEXT AND CHARACTER OF
THREE MAGNET SCHOOLS (1986).
7. "'[M]agnet school' is defined as a public elementary or secondary school or pub-
lic elementary or secondary education center that offers a special curriculum capable of
attracting substantial numbers of students of different racial backgrounds." 20 U.S.C.
7204 (1994).
8. Intra-district transfer plans allow students to attend any school within the school's
district without regard to the relation between the location of the residence and of the
school. Seattle, Boston, and Indianapolis are examples of districts employing such plans. See
Julie F Mead, Including Students with Disabilities in Parental Choice Programs: The Challenge of
Meaningful Choice, 101 WEST's EDUC. LAW REP. 463,463-64 (1995).
9. Inter-district plans allow the transfer of a child from one district to another. See id.
at 463.
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educational environments." As an alternative to compelled assignment
plans," these programs often formed the central mechanism for a district's
desegregation efforts, the quest for a declaration of unitary status, and the
end of court supervision of school operations that accompanies that
status. 12
Aside from attempting to create more racially balanced educational
environments, school choice today often adds new purposes, such as pa-
rental choice for the exploration of innovation'3 and/or for competition
created by choice, thus providing an impetus for school reform and im-
provement within the larger system of public schools. 4 As these new
forms of school choice have been added, policy-makers have operated
under the assumption that the same goals with respect to the racial com-
position of the student body not only could be honored as a matter of
10. These parental choice options often arose in direct response to court supervision,
and was either ordered or approved as a central component of several desegregation plans.
See Missouri v.Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992);Washing-
ton v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267
(1977); NAACP v. City ofYonkers, 251 E3d 31 (2nd Cir. 2001); Lockett v. Bd. of Educ.,
111 F3d 839 (11th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Charleston County Sch. Dist., 960 E2d 1227 (4th
Cir. 1992); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 839 F2d 1296 (8th
Cir. 1988).
11. See, e.g.,Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. at 461.
12. As explained by the Supreme Court in Green v. County School Board, a unitary
system of schools is the opposite of a dual segregated system. Accordingly, a unitary system
of schools is the target at which all efforts of a formerly segregated educational system
must be directed: "The transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education was
and is the ultimate end to be brought about" by court supervision. 391 U.S. 430, 436
(1968). The Green Court also established six factors for consideration to determine
whether unitary status had been achieved: (1) student assignment, (2) faculty, (3) staff, (4)
transportation, (5) extracurricular activities, and (6) facilities. Id. at 435. As will be ex-
plained in subsequent sections, a declaration of unitary status plays a large role in courts'
analysis of any currently operating race-conscious student selection practice in any choice
environment. While it is perfectly understandable why a district would want to have a
court publicly declare that it has successfully desegregated its system and now offers a
unitary system of education, one commentator has argued that school districts have moved
too quickly toward a declaration of unitary status. Gary Orfield, Conservative Activists and
the Rush Toward Resegregation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOT-
ING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 39 (Jay P Heubert, ed., 1999). Orfield further contends that
courts have been too quick to grant such petitions, moving much more rapidly than
courts had in earlier actions finding the existence of state ordered segregation. Id.
13. Charter school legislation often lists the fostering of educational innovation as its
purpose. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-23-102(2) (1999); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47601(c)
(2002); COLO. REV. STAT. 5 2 2-30.5-102(c) (2002); FLA. STAT. § 228.056(2)(c) (1998); and
IDAHO CODE § 33-5202(3) (2001).
14. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPIITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962);JOHN COONS &
STEPHEN SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL (1978);JOHN
CHUBB & TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990); WILLIAM H.
CLUNE & JOHN F. WIrE, CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: VOLUME 1: THE
THEORY OF CHOICE AND CONTROL IN EDUCATION (1990).
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law, but also should be honored as a matter of public policy." That as-
sumption, however, has come under increasing attack in the form of
lawsuits challenging race-conscious student selection processes in choice
environments. In fact, since 1998 ten cases16 have come before various fed-
eral courts to ask the question: Can schools use race in furtherance of
education for a multi-cultural society consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 7 of the United States Constitution?
The answer is unclear. Courts have long held that race may only be
used for governmental decision-making in very limited circumstances."
Anytime a governmental body employs a racial criterion, courts generally
use the most exacting judicial scrutiny, termed "strict scrutiny"'19 to de-
termine whether it is constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and complies with the non-discrimination
mandate of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.20 Under the strict
scrutiny standard, courts examine whether the use of the criterion is justi-
fied by the circumstances; in essence, whether the ends justify the means.
As an ends-means analysis, the courts assess whether the governmental
body (state or school district in this analysis) has articulated a "compelling
state interest" and whether the means employed to achieve that goal are
"necessary" and "narrowly tailored" to the purpose.2 1 Stated another way,
15. As an example, ten states with charter school legislation have adopted some sort of
racial and ethnic balancing provision that requires charter schools and their sponsors to
address the racial and ethnic representation of charter schools' student populations. CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 47605(b)(5)(G) (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 228.056(9)(a)(8) (2000); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 72-1906 (d)(2) (2001); MINN. STAT. 5 124D.10(9)(3) (2001); NEv. REV. STAT.
S 386.580(1) (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. 18A:36A-8(e) (West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 115C-
238.29F(g)(5) (2001); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.06(G) (Anderson 2002); S.C. CODE
ANN. 5 59-40-50(B)(6) (2001); Wis. STAT. § 118.40(lm)(b)(9) (2001).
16. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F3d 305 (2001) [hereinafter
Belk I1]; Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F Supp. 2d 1224 (WD. Wash.
2001); Brewer v.West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000); Comfort
ex tel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Conani., 100 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D. Mass. 2000); Hampton v.Jef-
ferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F Supp. 2d 358 (WD. Ky. 2000); Tuttle v. Arlington
County Sch. Bd., 195 F3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000);
Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 E3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529
U.S. 1019 (2000); Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F3d 1061 (9th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 121 U.S. 186 (2000); Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147
E3d 854 (9th Cir. 1998);Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 E3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).
17. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:"No state shall
... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
18. See, e.g., Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267 (1986); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
19. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,357-62 (1978).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
21. Adarand,515 U.S.at 235-37.
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the test requires the determination of whether: (1) the goal exceeds the
ordinary interests of government and can be characterized as one of the
most important tasks undertaken by the state; and (2) the use of a racial
criterion is virtually the only method available to achieve success.
2
As this article will demonstrate, the judicial panels applying strict
scrutiny to modern school choice contexts have reached differing conclu-
sions as to whether race-conscious student selection processes pass
constitutional muster. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has not
yet heard a case on this issue 3.2 Therefore, one can only speculate that it
would apply strict scrutiny as it has in non-school cases involving race-
based classifications.2 4 It is possible that the Court could determine that a
different analytical test should frame the issue of student selection and
assignment at the K-12 level. 25 In the absence of such a directive, nine of
the ten cases described in this article employed strict scrutiny as the ana-
lytic framework for discerning the answer to the question of the propriety
of race-conscious student selection processes.26
22. Professor Peter Rubin of Georgetown University describes strict scrutiny as the
process of first determining the importance of the government's goal and "incorporat[ing]
the idea that the costs of using a particular type of classification are great enough that the
achievement of even the most legitimate governmental purposes will not outweigh the
harm wrought by use of the classification" and, second, "ensur[ing] that the states purpose
was indeed the actual purpose:' "check[ing] for stereotyped thinking:' and ensuring that
no race-neutral alternative would achieve the same goals. Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doc-
trine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny after Adarand and Shaw, 149 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 1, 13-15 (2000). In regards to the second prong of strict scrutiny, William
Thro lists 4 factors attendant to the tailoring analysis: (1) "the efficacy of non-racial reme-
dies must be fully explored"; (2) "the racial remedy must be flexible and temporary";
(3) "there must be a realistic numerical relationship between the racial remedy and the
relevant population" and (4) "the racial remedy generally may not favor one group over
another.' William E. Thro, The Constitutionality of Eliminating De Facto Segregation in the
Public Schools, 120 WEsT's EDUC. L. REP. 895,906-07 (1997).
23. In 2000, the Supreme Court denied petitions for certiorari in Eisenberg v. Mont-
gomery County School District, 197 E3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019
(2000), and Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the University of California, 190 F.3d 1061
(9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 121 U.S. 186 (2000), and dismissed the petition for certiorari at
the request of the parties in Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board, 195 F3d 698 (4th
Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000).
24. See Adarand, 515 U.S. 200.
25. The Court was recently urged to "have a different standard" in school cases such
as these by a group of educational organizations. The brief does not describe precisely
what that standard should be, only that any analysis "consider the unique mission of public
schools?' Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards Association et al. at 10, Montgom-
ery County Pub. Sch. v. Eisenberg, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000) (No. 99-1069).
26. As will be discussed in upcoming sections, the tenth case did not apply strict scru-
tiny as the appellate court hearing the case determined that the district was still bound by
a court-ordered desegregation decree to use race in assigning students to its schools. See
Belk II, 269 E3d 305.
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This paper provides an in-depth examination of the ten recent court
decisions concerning race-based student selection processes. As these cases
will illustrate, school districts face increasing demands to justify any race-
conscious selection process. The significance of meeting the demands and
the implications for what appears to be an evolving legal theory is na-
tional in scope and broad in application. Some have even argued that
some of these cases mark a departure away from the Court's thinking in
Brown v. the Board of Education.27 It should also be noted that each of the
cases mentioned above occurred in the context of some form of school
choice, which heightens the significance of the research and the implica-
tions of its findings.2
8
To that end, this paper is divided into 3 parts. Part I provides a brief
description of each of the cases under scrutiny. Part II provides an exami-
nation of the patterns that can be discerned from an analysis of those ten
cases. Finally, Part III presents a proposed legal argument to support the
use of race-conscious student selection as a voluntary means to educa-
tional ends in public elementary and secondary schools. This prospective
education-based argument employs five assertions: (1) No child is denied
an education; (2) Choice is granted to parents as a means to a particular
goal; (3) Education for success in a diverse society is a compelling and
specific curricular goal within the discretion of the legitimate policy-
making authority of state and local authorities; (4) That goal is at the cen-
ter of the public elementary and secondary educational enterprise; and
(5) In today's world, conscious use of race is necessary and narrowly tai-
lored to that core educational goal.
Drawn from the analysis of the cases under study, these five assertions
form the foundation of an argument that is grounded by and consistent
with other rights-based decisions in education law.
27. See, e.g., John Charles Boger, Willful Colorblindness: The New Racial Piety and the
Resegregation of Public Schools, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1719 (2000). See also Robert L. Carter,
Thirty-five Years Later: New Perspectives on Brown, in RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY (Herbert Hill and James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993); Gary Orfield, School Desegrega-
tion after Two Generations: Race, Schools, and Opportunity in Urban Society, in RACE IN
AMERICA:THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (Herbert Hill and James E.Jones,Jr. eds., 1993).
28. The significance of the fact that these cases occur in parental school choice con-
texts stems from the fact that parental choice enjoys bipartisan support. For example, in the
2000 presidential election, both George Bush and Al Gore supported some form of school
choice. Accordingly, parental school choice is likely to expand not diminish in future years.
Therefore, understanding the role race may or may not play in the implementation of such
plans is crucial for educational policy-makers.
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1.TEN RECENT CASES ON RACE-CONSCIOUS
STUDENT SELECTION
The ten cases that form the focus of this inquiry arose in a variety of
contexts dealing with parental school choice. 9 Four cases involve inter- or
intra-district transfer programs aimed at reducing the presence of racial
isolation or imbalance in schools." Five cases involve admission to magnet
school programs.31 One case involves a university laboratory school.
32
Furthermore, these cases have arisen in different jurisdictions. Two
cases hail from California, two from Massachusetts, and one each from
Kentucky, Maryland, NewYork, North Carolina,Virginia, and Washington.
All ten arise in urban/suburban contexts. United States District Courts
decided three cases.33 The First, Second, Fourth and Ninth United States
Courts of Appeals rendered decisions in seven of the ten cases. Three of
the cases have been appealed to the United States Supreme Court.34 The
Supreme Court has denied the petitions for review in two of the cases3"
and the parties withdrew the petition in the third case before the Justices
determined whether to grant or deny hearing.36 Each case is briefly de-
scribed below in the order the decision was rendered. The nuances and
particulars of the court's analysis in each case will receive greater and
more specific attention in the analysis section that follows.
29. Two related cases are not included in this group: Rosenfeld v. Montgomery
County Pub. Sch., 41 E Supp. 2d 581 (D. Md. 1999) (concerning issues of standing and
Eleventh Amendment immunity for state officials and not reaching the merits of the Equal
Protection challenge); Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 62 F Supp. 2d 247 (D.
Mass. 1999) (determining an insufficient factual record precluded a determination on
whether either party could prevail on the merits). This study also omits settlements
reached prior to a court decision in cases filed on related issues. See Center for Individual
Rights, Settlement Reached in Pupil Assignment Case, available at http://www.cir-
usa.org/pressreleases/jacob-v-indpr.htm (discussing Jacobs v. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 625,
No. 99-CV-542 (D. Minn. 1999)).
30. Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F Supp. 2d 1224, 1226 (WD.Wash.
2001); Brewer v. West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 E3d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 2000);
Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 100 F Supp. 2d 57, 61 (D. Mass. 2000); Ho
v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F3d 854,856-59 (9th Cir. 1998).
31. Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 E3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998);Tuttle v.Arlington County Sch.
Bd., 195 F3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F3d
123 (4th Cir. 1999); Hampton v.Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F Supp. 2d 358 (WD.
Ky. 2000); Belk II, 269 F3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001).
32. Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F3d 1061 (9th Cir.
1999).
33. Comfort, 100 F Supp. 2d 57; Hampton, 102 F Supp. 2d 358; Parents Involved, 137 E
Supp. 2d 1224.
34. Eisenberg, 197 F3d 123; Hunter, 190 F3d 1061;and Tuttle, 195 E3d 698.
35. Eisenberg, 197 F3d 123; Hunter, 190 F3d 1061.
36. Tuttle, 195 F3d 698.
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A. Ho v. San Francisco Unified School District37
This case arose due to San Francisco Unified School District's
(SFUSD) continuance of the racial balancing provisions originally created
by a consent decree entered in connection with earlier desegregation liti-
gation." The policy, which governed the SFUSD's intra-district transfer
program, employed race as a consideration only when a single ra-
cial/ethnic group comprised 45% or more of the student enrollment in a
regular school or 40% or more in an alternative school. In the instant case,
the plaintiffs were children of Chinese descent denied requests to transfer
from their assigned school to another district school. SFUSD granted
transfers when space was available and the move did not negatively affect
the racial make-up of the sending or receiving school. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals remanded the case for the trial court to answer the
questions: "Do vestiges remain of the racism that justified ... the consent
decree in 1983?"' 9 And if so, whether the district's policy was "necessary
to remove the vestiges if they do remain."4
The parties in this suit later reached a stipulated settlement modify-
ing the existing consent decree on the issue of student assignment.41
While acknowledging the school district's authority to consider the racial
and ethnic diversity of its schools' student populations, the parties agreed
that "race or ethnicity may not be the primary or predominant considera-
tion in determining such [student] admission criteria."42 Furthermore, the
parties agreed that students would be asked but not required to self-
identify their race on enrollment forms.4 3 Still, the settlement allowed for
more direct use of racial and ethnic identifiers in the future if a situation
were to develop whereby "there may be identifiable racial or ethnic con-
centration at a particular school or schools that will adversely affect
SFUSD's educational goals or programs in that school or schools.' 44 It is
37. 147 F3d 854 (9th Cir. 1998).
38. NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (up-
holding a consent decree that used voluntary school choice as a means to integrate
SFUSD schools and remedy findings of discrimination). It should be noted that by the
terms of a stipulated settlement, approved later, SFUSD is scheduled to achieve unitary
status as of December 31,2002. NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F Supp. 2d
1021, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
39. Ho, 147 F3d at 865.
40. Id.
41. NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F Supp. 2d at 1023.
42. Id. at 1025.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1026. If such an eventuality occurs, the settlement agreement sets forth a
process for the parties to meet and discuss the matter and to come to terms, if necessary
with the help of a State Monitor, on further modifications in the district's student assign-
ment program. Id.
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also interesting to note, that although the judge did not make a ruling on
the issue, per se, the court expressed the opinion that "plaintiffs were likely
to succeed on their claim that the race-based student assignment plan is
no longer constitutional."45
B. Wessmann v. Gitten46
Boston Latin School (BLS), a public school serving the City of Bos-
ton, determines its student population largely by means of a competitive
examination. Although the school district had been declared unitary
with respect to student assignment," school officials continued to employ
a policy designed to maintain racial and ethnic diversity at BLS. The pol-
icy determined each applicant's composite score combining the entrance
exam score with his/her grade point average. 9 Those scores were then
ranked and those who scored in the top 50% of the applicants were des-
ignated as the "qualified applicant pool" (QAP). ° The first 50% of seats
available were filled strictly by merit from this pool.The remaining group
was designated the "remaining pool of qualified applicants" (RQAP).'
The racial and ethnic composition of the RQAP was then calculated by
sorting students into five categories (African American,White, Asian, His-
panic, and Native American) and computing the relative proportions of
each group in the pool.5 2 The remaining 50% of seats available were filled
in such a way that the racial proportion of the filled seats matched the
proportions of the RQAP.
A student denied entry under this procedure challenged the pro-
gram. The First Circuit Court of Appeals split 2 to 1 in finding the
program unconstitutional. The court examined two rationales given by
the Boston School Committee to justify its policy: (1) it promoted diver-
sity in education and (2) it targeted the vestiges of past discrimination. 3
In relation to the justification concerning diversity, the court noted several
problems. First, the court found fault in the district's consideration of only
five racial groups.5 Moreover, the school's diversity goal was tied solely to
racial and ethnic diversity and did not consider any other forms of diver-
sity. Second, the court determined that the policy violated the standards
45. Id. at 1029.
46. 160 F3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).
47. Id. at 792.
48. Morgan v. Nucci, 831 E2d 313 (1st Cir. 1987).




53. Id. at 796.
54. Id. at 798.
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set forth by Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.5 Rather than
using race as one of a number of criteria, the court concluded that "[t]he
policy does precisely what Justice Powell deemed anathematic: at a certain
point, it effectively forecloses some candidates from all consideration for a
seat at an examination school simply because of the racial or ethnic cate-
gory in which they fall" '5 6 Therefore, although the court assumed for the
sake of argument that diversity was a compelling state interest, the court
concluded the policy failed the narrow tailoring portion of strict scrutiny.
The school committee's second rationale of targeting vestiges of past
discrimination fared no better.The fact that Boston had been found by a
court to operate a segregated school system in the past did not convince
the court that the district's goal of racial diversity was sufficiently compel-
ling in the present. 7 To justify its approach, the school district tried to tie
the present imbalances to the deliberate segregating policies of the past. As
evidence of such a link, the school pointed to the low achievement test
scores of African-American and Hispanic students when compared with
the scores of Caucasian and Asian-American students. For the court, this
approach was too broad a scope from which to infer a causal connection.
"We do not propose that the achievement gap bears no relation to some
form of prior discrimination.We posit only that it is fallacious to maintain
that an endless gaze at any set of raw numbers permits a court to arrive at
a valid etiology of complex social phenomena.""8 The court characterized
the other indications of past discrimination offered by the defense as an-
ecdotal speculations without sufficient scientific rigor demonstrating
causation. 9
C. Tuttle v.Arlington County School Board'
The Arlington County School District in Virginia"1 used a weighted
lottery system for filling open seats at its magnet or alternative schools.6 2
Once the number of open seats was determined, each application was
assigned weights based on three criteria: "(1) whether the applicant was
from a low-income or special family background; (2) whether English was
55. Id. at 799-800 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. 265).
56. Wessmann, 160 F3d at 800.
57. Id. at 801-08.
58. Id. at 804.
59. Id. at 805-08.
60. 195 E3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
61. The Arlington County School District had been found to operate an unconstitu-
tional segregated school system in 1963. See Brooks v. County Sch. Bd., 324 F2d 303 (4th
Cir. 1963).The school district achieved unitary status in 1972. Hart v. County Sch. Bd.,
459 F2d 981,982 (4th Cir. 1972).
62. Tuttle, 195 E3d at 701-02.
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the applicant's first or second language; and (3) the racial or ethnic group
to which the applicant belonged."6, The stated goal of this policy was to
promote specialty school populations that mirrored the district's overall
population so as to "prepare and educate students to live in a diverse,
global society" and to "serve the diverse groups of students in the district,
including those from backgrounds that suggest they may come to school
with educational needs that are different from or greater than others."64
The policy had not been developed as part of any formal remedy to any
finding of past discrimination.
Parents of two children who were not selected and who had neither
siblings nor any factor that increased their probability of selection chal-
lenged the policy as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Specifically, they alleged that the racial crite-
rion used in the weighted lottery violated the constitution. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling that the pro-
gram violated the constitution.6 6 The school district had argued that the
program met the compelling state interest of diversity.The court accepted
that assertion for the sake of argument but did not decide whether diver-
sity was sufficiently compelling to meet this standard.67 Rather, the court
focused its analysis on whether the means employed were narrowly tai-
lored to address diversity.
The court determined that the use of the racial criterion as one of
the weighting factors constituted racial balancing and that racial balancing
in the absence of a remedial order contravenes the constitution.6' The
court also examined "(1) the efficacy of alternative race-neutral policies,
(2) the planned duration of the policy, (3) the relationship between the
numerical goal and the percentage of minority group members in the
relevant population or work force, (4) the flexibility of the policy, includ-
ing the provision for waivers if the goal cannot be met, and (5) the burden
on innocent third parties."69 The court found each factor to balance in
favor of the parents' position. First, the district had considered other race-
neutral policies before adopting the one under scrutiny.7 Second, the du-
ration of the policy was unspecified and had no stopping point.7 Third,
the policy engaged in racial balancing even though it did not set aside
seats for minorities and that balancing was "not require[d]" to achieve the
63. Id. at 701.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 702-03.
66. Id. at 708.
67. Id. at 705.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 706 (citing Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F3d
207,216 (4th Cir. 1993)). See also U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
70. Tuttle, 195 F3d at 706, n.11.
71. Id. at 706.
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goal of diversity.72 Fourth, the policy was inflexible because it did not con-
sider applicants as individuals but rather granted preferential treatment to
some applicants on the basis of race.73 Finally, the court stated "[wle find it
ironic that a Policy that seeks to teach young children to view people as
individuals rather than members of certain racial and ethnic groups classi-
fies those same children as members of certain racial and ethnic groups."74
Accordingly, the court concluded that the policy was not narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the stated goal of diversity.7
D. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schools76
The Montgomery County Board of Education in Maryland serves
approximately 125,000 students and operates some of its 183 schools as
magnet schools. Students who wish to attend one of the magnet schools
must petition for a transfer from the school assigned on the basis of geo-
graphical residence. At the time of the complaint, the district's policy
required that each request be screened according to four criteria:
(1) school stability, (2) utilization enrollment, (3) diversity profile," and
(4) the reason for the request (e.g., personal hardship).79
A transfer may be denied on the basis of diversity if the child's trans-
fer would affect the racial balance at either the sending or receiving
school in a "negative" way.8 To determine racial balance, students were
classified as an African American, Asian, Hispanic, or White.81 The targeted
balance was equivalent to the proportions of each racial group in the
overall student population.82 If granting the transfer would shift the per-
centages to a higher level than the countywide average for a particular
group, the transfer could be denied.This process also was intended to pre-
vent any school from becoming "racially isolated."8 3




76. 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999).
77. Utilization refers to the percent of student capacity at a given school. An
underutilized school operates below 80% capacity, while an overutilized school operates
above 100% capacity. Id. at 126.
78. The use of a "diversity profile" reflects the fact that the magnet schools were de-
veloped to create a diverse student body at the county's schools by means of voluntary
student transfers. Id. at 125.




83. Eisenberg, 197 E3d at 127.
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The school district had no history of court-ordered desegregation or
a finding of past discrimination. The Office for Civil Rights had investi-
gated a complaint in 1981 that Rosemary Hills Primary School was
approving student transfers in a way that led to "minority isolation" at that
school.84 The magnet school and transfer policy were developed, at least in
part, in response to that complaint.
Jacob Eisenberg, a white student, was entering first grade at the time
the controversy arose. His transfer request was denied due to the racial
provisions and thus he challenged the program." The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that the program failed to satisfy the re-
quirement that any use of a racial criterion be necessary and narrowly
tailored to a compelling state interest. As it had in Tuttle v. Arlington County
School District, the court declined to decide whether the district's diversity
goals met the compelling purpose portion of the test.,6 Instead, the court
concentrated on whether the means employed by the district were nar-
rowly tailored to meet the espoused ends.The court concluded they were
not. The court rejected the district's assertion that racial balancing was
necessary and held that such balancing was unconstitutional and that the
criteria used by the district resulted in transfers being approved on the
basis of race.87 For example, had this student challenger been African
American, Hispanic or Asian, his transfer would have been approved.
E. Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the University of California8
A lab school operated by the University of California-Los Angeles
tightly controlled admissions to the school by a committee who met each
year to determine what characteristics entering students should have in
order to fulfill the research being conducted during that year.89 In addi-
tion to gender, race, ethnicity, and family income, the committee
examined other factors such as dominant language, permanence of resi-
dence, and parents' willingness to comply with the school's parental
involvement requirements.
A student denied admittance sued the University alleging that the
racial criterion was unconstitutional.' The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals decided 2 to 1 to uphold this race-conscious selection procedure
84. Id. at 125, n. 2 .
85. Id. at 125.
86. Id. at 130.
87. Id. at 129.
88. 190 F3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999).
89. Id. at 1062.
90. Keeley Hunter, a child "who claims her ethnic identity as one-quarter Asian and
three-quarters Caucasian" brought suit through her parents in Hunter v. Regents of the
University of California, 971 E Supp. 1316, 1318 (C.D. Cal. 1997). Id. at 1063.
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because "California had a compelling state interest in operating a
research-oriented elementary school dedicated to improving the quality
of education in urban public schools."9" Furthermore, the court found the
school's "use of race/ethnicity in its admissions is narrowly tailored to
achieve the necessary laboratory environment to produce research results
which can be used to improve the education of California's ethnically
diverse urban public school population."92 Therefore, the school's use of
race-conscious selection survived constitutional scrutiny.
F Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central School District93
This case considered a challenge to a longstanding program operated
by the state of New York that allows students to voluntarily transfer be-
tween districts to achieve the goals of "Reducing Minority Group
Isolation; Encouraging Intercultural Learning; Promoting Academic Ex-
cellence and Fostering Responsible Civic Leadership."94 In its current
form only minority students are permitted to transfer out of predomi-
nately minority Rochester City School District (RCSD) schools to
suburban schools with low minority student populations. 9 Non-inority
suburban students are also given an opportunity to transfer to those
schools within RCSD with large minority populations. Transfer requests
are permitted only if they do "not negatively affect the racial balance of
the receiving school '." A minority pupil is defined by the regulations as
"a pupil who is of Black or Hispanic origin or is a member of another
racial minority group that historically has been the subject of discrimina-
tion"97
In this case, a White student who attended an urban mostly minority
school applied to transfer to a suburban school.98 She was accepted for the
inter-district transfer program in July 1998 after being interviewed by
Iroquois Elementary School's Assistant Principal. Her acceptance was later
revoked after another administrator noticed her appearance and checked
91. Hunter ex rel., 190 F3d at 1074. In his dissent, Judge Beezer compared the
educational research interest to the role model theory espoused by the defendant school
district in Wygant v.Jackson Board of Education and found insufficiently compelling by the
Supreme Court: "Just like the 'role model' theory in Wygant, an 'educational research'
rationale is 'amorphous' and admits of'no logical stopping point."' Id. (citing Wygant, 476
U.S. 267,275-76 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
92. Id. at 1066.
93. 212 F3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000).
94. Id. at 742.
95. Id. at 741.
96. Id. at 742.
97. N.Y COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 175.24(a) (1999).
98. Brewer, 212 E.3d at 741.
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her records to confirm that she listed Caucasian as her race. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals split 2-1 in reaching its decision. When consid-
ering the merits of the complaint, the majority applied a strict scrutiny
standard because of the school district's use of a racial classification. The
court found the central purpose of the program to be the "reduc[tion] of
racial isolation" for the purpose of "(1) 'preparing students to function in
adult society, in which they will encounter and interact with people from
many different backgrounds'; (2)'mak[ing] students more tolerant and
understanding of others throughout their lives'; and (3) 'eliminating de
facto segregation.""' It noted that the parties had not argued the issue of
defacto segregation at the trial court level, presumably because the defen-
dants believed the plaintiffs had conceded that reducing racial isolation
constituted a compelling state interest."°°
The district court had declared the program unconstitutional and
based its conclusion that the inter-district program failed the strict scru-
tiny test from Hopwood v. Texas,'0' a case in which the Fifth Circuit
concluded that remedying past governmental wrongdoing was the only
interest sufficiently compelling to justify racial classification. 10 2 The Second
Circuit found this reliance misplaced and pointed out that other circuits
have not found Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue so clear."'The
Second Circuit also cited the Supreme Court's decision in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,' °4 where the Supreme Court held that
even when no history of dejure discrimination exists, race, as one of many
factors to determine admission to a program, was permissible.
The court further pointed out that the district court had not con-
sulted precedent from within the Second Circuit, specifically Parent
Association ofAndrew Jackson High School v. Ambach ("Andrew Jackson I")"' s
and Parent Association of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach ("Andrew
Jackson II"),"°6 where the appellate court concluded that a voluntary high
school program aimed at reducing defacto segregation served a compelling
governmental interest. The Brewer court extensively reviewed the reason-
ing of Andrew Jackson I and I and reaffirmed the decisions in these cases,
finding no conflict between these precedents and subsequent cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court. The court concluded "that a compelling
99. Id. at 745.
100. Id.
101. 78 F3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
102. Id. at 944.
103. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 747. See also Smith v. Univ. ofWa., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200 (9th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2192 (2001) ("We, therefore, leave it to the Supreme
Court to declare that the Bakke rationale regarding university admissions policies has be-
come moribund, if it has.We will not.").
104. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
105. 598 E2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979).
106. 738 F2d 574,577, 579 (2d Cir. 1984).
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interest can be found in a program that has as its object the reduction of
racial isolation and what appears to be defacto segregation."""7
In the analysis of the narrow tailoring component of strict scrutiny,
the court determined that the district court erred because it considered
only whether the program was narrowly tailored to address "true diver-
sity" and not whether it was sufficiently tailored to the end of reducing de
facto segregation.' °8 Thus, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
District Court "to again explore the Program's administration on a more
fully developed factual record.""
G. Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn School Committee"'
The Lynn, Massachusetts School Committee adopted an intra-
district transfer policy entitled, "A Voluntary Plan for School Improvement
and the Elimination of Racial Isolation" (Lynn Plan).'" The Lynn Plan
assigns students to their neighborhood schools and guarantees that every
child may attend that school."'2 The plan also allows students to volunteer
to transfer to another school. Space permitting, transfers are approved
unless they would result in increased "racial isolation (too low a minority
percentage) or racial imbalance (too high a minority percentage).""13 Ele-
mentary schools are considered racially balanced if the ratio of White to
minority students in the school is within 15% of the same proportion in
the district as a whole. For middle schools and high schools, the percent-
age shifts to 10%. All high schools satisfy this requirement, but only 2 of 5
middle schools and none of the elementary schools satisfy the require-
ment."'
A group of students initially denied their choice school challenged
the program."' The district court judge determined that a preliminary
injunction was not warranted given the information available. The court,
although not ruling on the merits of the claim, laid out several issues that
the parties should address as they prepared for trial. First, the court
distinguished this case from Wessmann v. Gittens, finding that the Wessmann
decision provided guidance but did not control the outcome of this
107. Brewer, 212 F3d at 752.
108. Id. at 753.
109. Id.
110. 100 F Supp. 2d 57 (D. Mass. 2000).
111. Id. at 59. As the title of the plan indicates, the Lynn Plan did not arise because of
any court order, nor was the school district ever found to operate de jure segregation in its
schools.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 61.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 62.
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controversy."6 The court noted that, while the Wessmann court raised
numerous problems with diversity as a compelling state interest, it did not
hold that diversity could never be compelling. Second, the court noted
that the school district would have a "substantial burden" and that the
court would "carefully scrutinize the record, and ... will not 'allow
generalities emanating from the subjective judgments of local officials to
dictate whether a particular percentage of a particular racial or ethnic
group is sufficient or insufficient [to achieve the policy's stated goals]."""
To that end, the parties were alerted to the expectation that the school
district would have to "link the concrete workings of the Lynn Plan to
reliable social science evidence. " ' 8
H. Hampton v.Jefferson County Board of Education"9
This Kentucky case involved a challenge to the operation of one of
the magnet schools operated by the Jefferson County Board of Education,
the Central High Magnet Career Academy (Academy). Brought by a
group of African-American students denied entry to the high school, the
plaintiffs challenged the race-conscious selection process used at the
school by filing a petition to dissolve an existing desegregation decree. 20
The Academy has no geographic attendance area from which students are
routinely assigned. Instead, it was developed as a means to further integra-
tion by providing an attractive program that allows students to pursue one
of four special programs; business, law and government, computer tech-
nology, and medicine. 2'
The student population of the school at the time the plaintiffs were
denied entry was 50% African American, the upper limit for racial
concentration established under the district's desegregation plan. 2
Although the school was under-subscribed, 2 3 the district denied the
116. Comfort ex rel., 105 F Supp. 2d at 65.
117. Id. at 66 (citing Wessmann, 160 F3d at 800).
118. Id. at 67, n.18. On a subsequent complaint involving the same parties, the court
ruled that since the children involved had been accepted at their preferred schools and
faced only a "theoretical possibility of future harm," plaintiffs lacked the standing to seek
declaratory or injunctive relief. The judge did allow the case to go forward in order to
determine whether or not plaintiffs were entitled to nominal damages for their earlier
denial of transfer requests based on their race. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 150 F Supp.
2d 285 (D. Mass. 2001).
119. 102 FSupp.2d358 (WD. Ky. 2000).
120. Id. at 359. For purposes of this article, the court's analysis of the dissolution peti-
tion will not be reviewed. Rather, only the court's discussion regarding the magnet
school's student selection processes will be discussed.
121. Id. at 377.
122. Id. (The range was set at 15%--50%).
123. Id. (The school was 300-400 students below capacity).
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students' transfer requests, because their admittance would have placed the
school outside the established racial guidelines. Thus, for an additional
African-American student to be admitted, a student of another race
would have to apply and be admitted.
After determining that the petitioners' request for dissolution of the
desegregation decree should be granted, the district court concluded that
as a consequence, the district's use of race in admissions at the Academy
could no longer withstand constitutional scrutiny.124 The court first ac-
knowledged that diversity may provide a compelling state interest in the
absence of a remedial order,12 but concluded that "the current student
assignment method for Central-which fixates only on race-does not
satisfy any diversity analysis and must be stopped.'' 26 The court also recog-
nized that the district might assert that it has a compelling interest in
maintaining the gains made through its desegregation efforts. However,
the court reasoned that such an interest is not "categorically compel-
ling. 1 27 Instead the court distinguished between what it termed "vertical
and horizontal distributions of resources."'28 The court explained that
since most schools are fungible, movement from one to another is a hori-
zontal choice. In contrast, since the focus of instruction at the Academy
specified a particular and unique focus, the choice to attend was vertical,
more analogous to admissions into higher education institutions. There-
fore,"[w]hen it decides who may attend [the Academy],JCPS uses a racial
classification that denies a benefit, causes a harm, and imposes a burden on
unsuccessful African-American applicants."'29 For these reasons, the court
ordered the district to revise its admission policies at the Academy and
any similar policies for other magnet schools.'
I. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education3'
This case is the latest in a line of cases chronicling the desegregation
efforts, or the lack thereof, made by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School
District.1' Like Hampton, the challenge to the district's magnet school
plan was eventually considered as part of a larger issue of whether the
124. Id. at 379-82.
125. Hampton, 102 F Supp. 2d at 378 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. 265).
126. Id. at 379.
127. Id. at 380.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 381.
130. Id. at 382. Using the same logic, the court stated that the district's use of race at
non-magnet schools (horizontal choices) was constitutionally permissible. Id. at 381.
131. 269 E3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001).
132. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Capac-
chione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 80 F. Supp. 2d 557 (WD. N.C. 1999).
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school district had achieved unitary status with respect to its desegrega-
tion efforts. "'
Cristina Capacchione, who identifies her race as Hispanic and
Caucasian, had been denied entry into one of the district's magnet
schools.' Her father filed suit challenging the district's magnet school
admissions policies.The admissions procedure called for applicants to first
be screened for proximity of residence to the school, as a set number of
seats are reserved for neighborhood children.' 35 Next, applicants who were
siblings of returning students are automatically admitted.'36 Finally, re-
maining seats were filled by means of two "parallel lotteries, one for black
students and one for students of other races," until the racial balance was
40% African American and 60% other students.' 7
Sitting en banc, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals divided 6-5 in
deciding that the magnet school program survived constitutional scrutiny.'
38
The decision hinged on whether the magnet program had been established
as part of the court-ordered desegregation efforts or whether it was a vol-
untary effort to address the effects of increasing neighborhood racial
isolation. 13 The court determined that the magnet program was part of the
district's larger plan to remove the vestiges of discrimination. Thus, bound
by the Supreme Court's precedent in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education,'40 the program was a constitutional remedy. 4 As Chief Judge
Wilkinson explained:
It is true that in the early 1990's, the school board in its
magnet program eagerly accepted the courts' invitation to
rely upon numerical benchmarks. I believe, however, that is
necessary to afford a school board some latitude in
133. That portion of the case will not be discussed here. Rather, as with HaIpton, this
discussion will concern only the analysis with regard to race-conscious student selection in
the magnet schools operated by the school district.
134. Belk II, 269 E3d at 316-17. See also Capacchione v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Sch.,
57 F Supp. 2d 228,239 (WD.N.C. 1999).
135. Capacchione, 57 F Supp. 2d at 287.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Belk II, 269 E3d at 311.The panel also decided by a vote of 7-4 that the Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg School District had achieved unitary status in all respects, but denied
by a vote of 6-5 a petition for attorneys' fees on the unitary status issue.The court unani-
mously vacated the district court's injunction preventing the school district from
considering race in its magnet school student selection process and unanimously affirmed
the imposition of sanctions against the school district for failing to respond to requests for
additional information during the discovery process. Id.
139. Id. at 354. Although, the plaintiffs argued that even if the magnet program was
developed pursuant to the desegregation order, it nevertheless failed strict scrutiny and was
therefore unconstitutional. Id.
140. 402 U.S. 1.
141. Belk 11, 269 F3d at 411.
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attempting to meet its desegregative obligations if we are
not to undermine the rule of law. To do otherwise leaves the
Board between a rock and a hard place. Namely, if the
school board fails to carry out the court desegregation order,
it can be cited for contempt or held not to have achieved
unitariness. But if the Board acts aggressively to implement
the court order, it risks facing judicial condemnation and
the threat of litigation on the grounds that it was acting
ultra vires. This is not the kind of quandary into which we
should force institutions that are, for better or worse, under
judicial decree. 14 2
The court also noted that this connection to an existing desegregation
order distinguished the case from its earlier decisions in Eisenberg and Tut-
tle. 143
J. Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1144
This case arose from a challenge to the Seattle School District's in-
tra-district open enrollment program where enrollments at each of the
district's ten high schools are determined via an "open choice" program. 145
Students list the schools they desire to attend in order of preference. If a
school receives more applicants than seats, students are selected according
to "tiebreakers." First, siblings of returning students are admitted and next,
"students whose race will help mitigate the imbalance of the racial
makeup of the chosen school" are selected. 146 The racial tiebreaker was
only employed in schools where the student population varies more than
15 percentage points from the overall racial makeup of the student popu-
lation, which, at the time, was "approximately 40% white and 60%
nonwhite."' 14 The purpose of the choice program and its use of a racial
tiebreaker is to "achiev[e] diversity, limito racial isolation, and provid[e] an
equal opportunity to receive a quality education"' 48 A group of parents
142. Id. at 354.
143. Id. at 410-11 ("The distinction between a unitary school system and a school
system under court order to desegregate is, from a legal standpoint, fundamental.").
144. 137 F Supp. 2d 1224 (WD.Wash. 2001).
145. Id. at 1226.





Conscious Use of Race
concerned that their children would not be assigned to their school of
choice filed suit to challenge the program's constitutionality.
4 9
The court, applying strict scrutiny, described the school district's
purpose for the open enrollment policy as a means "to mitigate the his-
torical effects on its high schools of the residential segregation of Seattle's
neighborhoods, and to allow all students the opportunity to benefit from
the pedagogical and socio-cultural values a racially diverse school of-
fers" '5s The court determined that this goal squared with a number of
Supreme Court precedents recognizing the authority of local school
boards to devise voluntary measures to address de facto segregation, and
therefore constituted a compelling state interest.'5 '
Turning to the narrow tailoring analysis, the court found that
evidence demonstrated that the district's schools "would revert to their
pre-existing 'natural state' of racial segregation" within a few years if the
program did not exist.'2 The court noted with approval several features of
the policy that demonstrated the limited use of race: (1) the policy applied
the tiebreaker only to those schools that had been deemed out of balance
and as soon as an entering class of students achieved balance, the policy
called for remaining seats to be filled without examination of race; (2) the
policy did not call for a specific quota but rather allows a 15% deviation
from the current racial proportions of the student body; and (3) the
district had a history of "reducing" the use of race in student assignment
policies, including the end of mandatory busing.' 3 Finally, the court
determined that the open choice policy "is a 'deck-shuffle' . . .and as such
does not, strictly speaking, prefer one race over any other" since all
children are subject to the plan.' 4 For these reasons the court held that
the policy survived strict scrutiny and granted the school district's motion
for summary judgment.
149. The plaintiffs also asserted that the program created a racial preference in contra-
vention of the Washington Civil Rights Act (RCW 49.60.400, also known as "Initiative
200") and in violation of the Washington State Constitution. Id. The court rejected this
claim finding the program did not create a preference and, in fact, honored the Washington
Supreme Court's earlier precedents establishing a constitutional duty to operate integrated
schools. Id. at 1228 (citing Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 495 R2d 657,
661 (Wash. 1972).
150. Id. at 1233.
151. Id. at 1234. See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971)); North Carolina Bd. Of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971);Washington v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 242 (1973);
Bustop, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 439 U.S. 1380, 1381 (1978).
152. Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d at 1237.
153. Id. at 1238-39.
154. Id. at 1239.
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K. Summary of Cases
In providing an overview of the ten cases reviewed, one cannot con-
clude judicial uniformity. Table I below provides a summary of the cases
according to the policies under scrutiny and the holdings of the courts.
Three race-conscious programs were declared constitutional,' four were
found unconstitutional, ' and three were placed in the "maybe" category
as the courts remanded the cases for further proceedings.'57 It is also inter-
esting to note that in addition to the split between courts on the
outcomes of the cases, there was considerable dissension within courts in
reaching a conclusion with four decisions being the product of divided
courts."' Despite these seemingly divergent outcomes, it is possible to
extrapolate several patterns.
TABLE I
TEN CASES ON RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT SELECTION SUMMARIZED
CASE LOCATION/COURT POLICY UNDER RULING OF THE
SCRUTINY COURT
Ho by Ho v. San San Francisco/ Continuance of Racial criterion may
Francisco Unified 9th Circuit Ct. of racial balancing or may not be
School District Appeals provisions of a constitutional;
consent decree remanded with
when students wish further instructions.




Wessmann v. Boston/ Weighted selection Racial criterion
Gittens 1st Circuit Ct. of process that used unconstitutional.
Appeals race as one factor
for admittance to the
Boston Latin School.
Tuttle v. Arlington Arlington County, Weighted selection Racial criterion
County School Virginia/ process that used unconstitutional.
Board 4th Circuit Ct. of race as one factor
Appeals for selection into a
district magnet or
I _ _ _specialty school.
155. Hunter, 190 F3d 1061; Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d 1224; and Belk II, 269 E3d
305.
156. essmann, 160 E3d 790; Tuttle, 195 F3d 698; Eisenberg, 197 E3d 123; and Hampton,
102 F Supp. 2d 358.
157. Ho, 147 F3d at 865; Brewer, 212 F3d at 741; and Comfort, 100 F Supp. 2d at 60.
158. Wessmann, 160 F3d 790; Hunter, 190 F3d 1061; Brewer, 212 F3d at 740; and Belk II,
269 F3d 305.
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CASE LOCATION/COURT POLICY UNDER RULING OF THE
SCRUTINY COURT
Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Selection process Racial criterion
Montgomery County Maryland/ using race as one unconstitutional.





Hunter ex rel. Brandt Los Angeles/ Selection process Racial criterion
v. the Regents of the 9th Circuit Ct. of using race as one constitutional.
University of Appeals factor for admittance
California, into the UCLA
laboratory school.
Brewer v. West Rochester, New Selection process Racial criterion may
Irondequoit Central York/ using race as a or may not be
School District 2nd Circuit Ct. of singular criterion for constitutional;
Appeals participation in an vacated injunction &
inter-district transfer remanded with
program operated further instructions.
by the state to
reduce racial
isolation due to de
facto segregation.
Comfort ex rel. Lynn, Selection process Racial criterion may
Neumyer v. Lynn Massachusetts/ U.S. using race as one or may not be
School Committee Dist. Ct. of Mass. criterion for constitutional;
participation in an denied request for
intra-district transfer preliminary
program operated injunction.
by the district, in
part, to reduce racial
isolation due to de
facto segregation.
Hampton v. Louisville, Selection process Racial criterion
Jefferson County Kentucky/U.S. Dist. using race as a unconstitutional.
Board of Education Ct. for the Western singular criterion for







Belk v. Charlotte- Charlotte, North Selection process Racial criterion
Mecklenberg Carolina/ 4th Circuit using race for constitutional.
Court of Appeals participation in a
magnet program
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CASE LOCATION/COURT POLICY UNDER RULING OF THE
SCRUTINY COURT
Parents Involved in Seattle, Selection process Racial criterion
Community Schools Washington/U.S. using race as one constitutional.
v. Seattle School Dist. Ct. for the criterion for
District No. 1 Western District of participation in an
Washington intra-district transfer
program operated
by the district, in
part, to reduce racial
isolation due to de
facto segregation.
II. ANALYsIs OF PATTERNS
Although each of the decisions in these cases rests on the specificity
of the particular facts of each policy under scrutiny, comparative analysis
of decisions still yields some notable patterns.Those patterns include gen-
eral observations, the application of strict scrutiny analysis, the reading of
Supreme Court precedents, and courts' reliance on social science research
in their analysis.This section reviews those patterns.
A. General Observations
Several patterns reveal themselves at first glance. First, it cannot es-
cape notice that, with the exceptions of Ho v. San Francisco Unified School
District"9 and Hampton v. Jefferson County Board of Education,6° White chil-
dren who were denied entrance into their school of choice filed each
challenge. 6 ' Second, unlike the discrimination at issue in Brown v. Board of
Education,"'2 each policy under scrutiny here was intended to integrate,
not segregate, students on the basis of race. In that way, these cases all ex-
amine what has been called "benign" discrimination, that is, the use of
159. 147 E3d 854 (1998).
160. 102 F Supp. 2d 358 (2000).
161. Sharon Rush suggests that "white privilege" blinds many people of good will to
the existence of modern racism, particularly institutional racism and the limits placed on
minorities. She writes: "Thus, color-blindness seems to offer a way out of the race paradox
that perplexes people of goodwill. Specifically, they are most comfortable not talking about
race and succeed in avoiding such discussion so long as the world operates under their
view of color-blindness. Correspondingly, they are less reluctant to talk about race in in-
stances where they believe the color-blind principle is violated, as they think it is in
affirmative action." Susan E. Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn't Enough, 32
CONN. L. RiEv. 1, 20 (1999). See also Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32
AKRON L. Rav. 603 (1999).
162. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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race for "good" rather than "malevolent" intentions. 163 Third, given the
espoused intentions of the programs, it is interesting, but perhaps not sur-
prising, to note that organizations participating as amici curiae,' all filed
briefs in support of the school districts. These groups, filing briefs indi-
vidually or in combination, include an impressive array of educational and
public policy groups. 161 In addition, the United States Department ofJus-
tice has filed amicus briefs in support of the schools' use of race-conscious
practices in three of the cases.
66
B. Application of Strict Scrutiny
Although these general observations are interesting, the central issue
in each case is the method the courts employed in weighing the interests
involved when reaching their respective decisions. Courts in nine out of
the ten cases reviewed in this article employed strict scrutiny to guide
their analysis. Only the Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
court did not, because it determined that the school district was allowed
and even compelled to consider race in student assignments until the dis-
trict achieved unitary status with respect to that aspect of district
operations.'67 Table II, below, outlines the application of strict scrutiny for
each of the nine cases employing the test.'68
163. Regents of the Univ. ofCal. v. Bakke, 428 U.S. 265,294 (1978).
164. Plural of amicus curiae, which means "a person who is not a party to a lawsuit but
who petitions the court ... to file a brief in the action because that person has a strong
interest in the subject matter." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 83 (7th ed. 1999).
165. The groups that have filed such amicus briefs include: American Association of
School Administrators, Association of Multi-Ethnic Americans, Center for the Study of
Bi-racial Children, Council of Great City Schools, Horace Mann League, Magnet Schools
of America, National Alliance of Black School Educators, National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), National Association for Multicultural Edu-
cation, National Association of Secondary School Principals, National School Boards
Association (and various state affiliates).
166. The Department of Justice filed such briefs in Tuttle v. Arlington County School
Board, 195 F3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schools,
197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), and Brewer v.West Irondequoit Central School District, 212
F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000). It should be noted that each of these cases occurred under the
Clinton Administration. It is unknown what stance the Bush Administration will take on
the issue.
167. 269 F3d 305,353-355 (4th Cir. 2001).
168. To reiterate, the application of strict scrutiny requires a determination of a com-
pelling state interest and an analysis determining whether the means are narrowly tailored
to achieve that compelling state interest.
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TABLE II
APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY IN BY RECENT COURTS
CASE COMPELLING STATE NARROW TAILORING
INTEREST ANALYSIS
Ho by Ho v. San Francisco Complying with the consent Use of racial criterion may be
Unified School District decree is a compelling state narrowly tailored if: the policy
147 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 1998). interest if: "vestiges remain of "is... necessary to remove
the racism that justified ... the vestiges if they do
the consent decree in 1983?" remain" (at 865).
(at 865).
Wessmann v. Gittens Assumed without deciding School erred by defining
160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998). that racial diversity could be diversity as just racial and
a compelling state interest, ethnic diversity; program only
slightly altered the racial
Rejected school's contention make-up of school from what
that the program served the a merit-only approach would
goal of remedying vestiges of have produced; determined
past discrimination because: that policy was one of racial
(a) the district had been balancing; policy "does not
declared unitary in 1987; and meet the Bakke standard" (at
(b) achievement gap 800).
between minority and non-
minority students not enough "[W]e fail to see how the
to show remaining vestiges adoption of an admissions
of past discrimination. policy that espouses a brand
of proportional representation
is designed to ameliorate the
harm that allegedly occurred"
(at 807).
Tuttle v. Arlington County Assumed without deciding Determined that policy was
School Board that racial diversity could be one of racial balancing and
195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999). a compelling state interest, that it was not narrowly
tailored to the interest of
diversity.
Eisenberg v. Montgomery Assumed without deciding Determined that policy was
County Public Schools that racial diversity could be one of racial balancing and
197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999). a compelling state interest, that it was not narrowly
tailored to the interest of
diversity.
Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. the Held that state's (university's) After reviewing testimony
Regents of the University of interest in operating a from a "parade of experts"
California research-oriented elementary held that use of race in
190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999). school in order to learn how admissions was "narrowly
to improve the quality of tailored to achieve the
elementary education in necessary laboratory
urban school districts was environment" (at 1067).
compelling.
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CASE COMPELLING STATE NARROW TAILORING
INTEREST ANALYSIS
Brewer v. West Irondequoit "[A] compelling interest can Held that district court erred
Central School District be found in a program that because it considered only
212 F.3d 738 (2nd Cir. 2000). has as its object the whether the program was
reduction of racial isolation narrowly tailored to address
and what appears to be de "true diversity" and not
facto segregation" (at 752, whether it was sufficiently
emphasis in original), tailored to the end of
reducing de facto
segregation (at 752).
Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Assumed that diversity could "[D]efendants [school
Lynn School Committee be a compelling state officials] will have to link the
100 F. Supp.2d 57 (D.Mass. interest, concrete workings of the
2000). Lynn Plan to reliable social
science evidence" (at 67,
note 18).
Hampton v. Jefferson County Assumed that diversity could "Without a doubt, however,
Board of Education,102 F. be a compelling state the current assignment
Supp.2d 358 (W.D.Ky. 2000). interest, method for Central-which
fixates only on race-does
not satisfy any diversity
"[V]oluntary maintenance of analysis and must be
the desegregated school stopped" (at 379).
system should be considered
a compelling state interest Magnet school creates
... [but] like many other "vertical effects" and
interest, this one is not therefore using a racial
categorically compelling" (at classification "denies a
379). benefit, causes a harm, and




Parents Involved in "Achieving racial diversity "Defendants have presented
Community Schools v. and mitigating the effects of sufficient evidence that a less
Seattle School District No. 1, de facto segregation are, the burdensome plan would not,
137 F. Supp.2d 1224 court finds, compelling at this time, produce the(W.D.Wash. 2001). government interests as a degree of integration
matter of law" (at 1235). necessary to achieve their
goals. The court finds
therefore that the defendants
have established that their
plan is narrowly tailored to
further the compelling
interests asserted in this
case." (at 1239).
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1. Application of Strict Scrutiny-Compelling Ends?
In analyzing the compelling state interest invoked in the cases exam-
ined, one can discern several patterns. But first, it is interesting to focus on
what could be termed the outlier case of the group. Hunter is by far the
most unique case arising from the most unusual set of facts. Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit's application of strict scrutiny focuses on inquiries not appli-
cable to the other situations. In Hunter, the educational context of a
university laboratory school served multiple goals, particular among them,
UCLA's research mission.169 It was that mission, not the curricular obliga-
tions owed to the students attending the school, that formed the
justification for the use of race-conscious student selection processes. Ac-
cordingly, the Hunter court's discussion of the compelling state interest
asserted by the university examined considerations not at issue in the other
cases. 7 ' In examining the patterns found in the other cases, the courts' con-
sideration of "diversity" necessitates attention. Although seven opinions
engaged in discussions of the issue of diversity,17' it becomes clear that "di-
versity" is a fluid term without uniform meaning. As the Wessmann court
observed, "[t]he word 'diversity" like any other abstract concept, does not
admit of permanent, concrete definition. Its meaning depends not only on
time and place, but also upon the person uttering it."'72 Careful examination
of these cases and the discussions of diversity occurring in the party and
amici briefs suggests three distinct iterations of the term-each with differ-
ent consequences for the application of strict scrutiny analysis. The courts
have used "diversity" to mean: (1) diversity as an extension of the right to
free speech; (2) diversity as an extension of the district's curricular control;
and (3) diversity to address and combat the effects of defacto segregation.
a. Diversity as an Extension of the Right to Free Speech
Diversity as an extension of the right to free speech can be found in
the First Circuit's decision in Wessmann, 73 in the Fourth Circuit's decisions
in Tuttle'74 and Eisenberg,"' and in the federal district court's holding in
169. 190 F3d at 1062.
170. Id. at 1063.
171. Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 E Supp. 2d 1224 (WD. Wash.
2001); Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 100 F Supp. 2d 57 (D. Mass. 2000);
Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F3d 790, 796-800 (lst Cir. 1998); Tuttle, 195 E3d 698; Eisenberg,
197 E3d 123; Brewer, 212 F3d at 749-752; Hampton, 102 F Supp. 2d at 378-79;.
172. Wessmann, 160 F3d at 796.
173. Id. at 797.
174. 195 F3d at 704.
175. 197 E3d at 130-32.
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Hampton.176 The majority opinion in Wessmann captures this idea with the
following statement: "Encounters between students of varied backgrounds
facilitate a vigorous exchange of ideas that not only nourishes the intel-
lect, but also furthers mutual understanding and respect, thereby eroding
prejudice and acting as a catalyst for social harmony.""' Later, finding fault
with this conceptualization of diversity, the court continues:
Furthermore, if justified in terms of group identity, the Pol-
icy suggests that race or ethnic background determines how
individuals think or behave-although the School Commit-
tee resists this conclusion by arguing that the greater the
number of a particular group, the more others will realize
that the group is not monolithic. Either way, the School
Committee tells us that a minimum number of persons of a
given race (or ethnic background) is essential to facilitate
individual expression. This very position concedes that the
Policy's racial/ethnic guidelines treat "individuals as the
product of their race" a practice that the Court consistently
has denounced as impermissible stereotyping178
Ironically, this iteration of diversity has its home in the Supreme
Court's decision in Bakke, a case that established the permissible use of
race in student selection at the higher education level. As Justice Powell
explained, this conception of diversity is tied to the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech and the relationship "academic freedom"
has to that right:
Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special con-
cern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university
to make its own judgments as to education includes the
selection of its student body ... The atmosphere of"specula-
tion, experiment and creation"--so essential to the quality
of higher education-is widely believed to be promoted by
a diverse student body. As the Court noted in Keyishian, it is
not too much to say that the "nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure" to the ideas and
mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples
.. Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the
right to select those students who will contribute the most
to the "robust exchange of ideas," petitioner invokes a coun-
tervailing constitutional interest, that of the First
176. 102 E Supp. 2d at 378.
177. 160 E3d at 797.
178. Id. at 799 (quoting Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,912 (1995)).
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Amendment. In this light, petitioner must be viewed as
seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in
the fulfillment of its mission.179
Wessmann and the other courts' use of diversity in this Bakke-esque
manner may stem from the fact that they examined magnet school poli-
cies, where the application and selection processes are arguably most
analogous to the higher education environment.The Brewer court termed
the notion of diversity, "true diversity" noting that this view of diversity
"may certainly be defined more broadly than race."18 ° Furthermore, this
broadness of definition makes it more difficult to sustain arguments that
the program is sufficiently narrow to that end when the second portion of
the strict scrutiny test, the narrow tailoring analysis, is applied.
Moreover, differences between the higher education and K-12 con-
texts may be neglected when the state's interest is couched as one of "true
diversity."8 ' As the Parents Involved court observed, "interests asserted at the
higher education level carry much different implications than those as-
serted at the elementary and secondary school level " '2 In fact, Judge
Gertner, in the Comfort decision, suggests that the Wessmann court missed
this important distinction:
The diversity interest defendants argue here makes no as-
sumptions about any groups' "unique contribution." Rather,
it reflects a concern that elementary school children simply
get used to being in classrooms with people different from
themselves. In fact, it assumes that the more diverse a class-
room is, the more likely students will learn that all people
are different, no matter what their color or ethnic back-
ground. It is not a form of stereotyping, but a method to
prevent the formation of stereotypes.1 8 3
It is this focus on what a child learns that presumably gives rise to the
second definition of diversity; diversity as an extension of the district's
curricular control.
179. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-313 (internal citations omitted).
180. 212 E3d at 752.
181. See e.g., Kevin Brown, The Constitutionality of Racial Classifications in Public School
Admissions, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (2000);Joanna R. Zahler, Lessons in Humanity: Diversity as
a Compelling State Interest in Public Education, 40 B.C. L. REv. 995 (1999).
182. Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d at 1235.
183. Comfort, 100 F Supp. 2d at 65, n. 12.
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b. Diversity as an Extension of the Districts Curricular Control
The definition of diversity as an extension of the state's legitimate
interests in curricular control' 84 was present in several briefs. A brief filed
by the National School Boards Association and other educational organi-
zations in support of Montgomery County's petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court in Eisenberg articulated this viewpoint:
The public school curriculum goes beyond merely the tradi-
tional academic goals of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Our
communities depend upon the leaders of K-12 to do much
more to fully accomplish their mission. A complete education
is holistic, addressing the child's development in areas of social
skills, workplace skills, and critical thinking, nurturing a
youngster's ability to grow in all respects.' 5
This argument asserts that race-conscious selection processes merely
effectuate the district's educational policy goals and are, therefore, a cur-
ricular decision within the discretion of school authorities and due
considerable deference from reviewing courts.'86 To support this assertion,
proponents refer to dicta from the Supreme Court's opinion in the deseg-
regation case, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, which
states:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad
power to formulate and implement educational policy and
might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare
students to live in a pluralistic society each school should
have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting
the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an
educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers
of school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional
violation, however, that would not be within the authority
of a federal court. 18
7
184. See, e.g., State ex rel. Andrews v. Webber, 8 N.E. 708 (Ind. 1886); Sch. Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973); Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,207 (1982). But see, Wessmann, 160 E3d at 797, n.3.
185. Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards Association et al. at 12, Montgom-
ery County Public Schools v. Eisenberg, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000) (No. 99-1069).
186. See, e.g., Schenipp, 374 U.S. 203; San Antonio Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 55; Rowley, 458
U.S. at 207. But see, Wessmnann, 160 E3d at 797, n.3.
187. 402 U.S. at 16 cited in Brief of Amici Curiae the United States at 15, Brewer v.
West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000) (No. 99-7186). See also,
Parents Inolved, 137 E Supp. 2d at 1234.
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Using the tool of controlling the racial composition of schools for
curricular ends was also reflected in the reasoning of the Parents Involved
court.The court noted with approval the curricular interests identified by
the Board of Directors of the Seattle School District as the purpose for its
open choice policy. The board encapsulated those interests by issuing its
"Board Statement Reaffirming Diversity Rationale." The statement reads:
Diversity in the classroom increases the likelihood that stu-
dents will discuss racial or ethnic issues and be more likely
to socialize with people of different races. Diversity is thus a
valuable resource for teaching students to become citizens in
a multi-racial/multi-ethnic world.
Providing students the opportunity to attend schools with
diverse student enrollment also has inherent educational
value from the standpoint of education's role in a democ-
ratic society ... Diversity brings different viewpoints and
experiences to classroom discussions and thereby enhances
the educational process. It also fosters racial and cultural un-
derstanding, which is particularly important in a racially and
culturally diverse society such as ours.
Based on the foregoing rationale, the Seattle School Dis-
trict's commitment is that no student should be required to
attend a racially concentrated school. The District is also
committed to providing students with the opportunity to
voluntarily choose to attend a school to promote integra-
tion. The District provides these opportunities for students
to attend a racially and ethnically diverse school, and to assist
in the voluntary integration of a school, because it believes
that providing a diverse learning environment is education-
ally beneficial for all students. '88
The Comfort court raises an interesting question stemming from the
logical extension of the courts' reasoning in cases like Wessmann, Tuttle,
and Eisenberg. If the constitution prohibits race-conscious practices for
establishing the composition of an entire school's student body, "[w]ould
there be a constitutional impediment to a school administrator assigning
students to classes within a school building to maximize diversity to pre-
vent [B]lack children from choosing one class, and [W]hite children
choosing another[?]' 89
188. Minutes of Executive Session of the Board of Directors, Nov. 17, 1999,
Taylor Decl., Exh. 3 at 12, quoted in Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d at 1232.
189. Comfort, 100 F Supp. at 67, n.17. In fact, a recent case out of the Seventh Circuit
considered exactly this point. Billings v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 807 (7th Cir.
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2001). On the issue of determining class composition, the court granted summary judg-
ment on behalf of the school district because even though race and ethnicity factored into
class assignment, the complaining student had been assigned to his class for reasons unre-
lated to his race. The court then examined another alleged Equal Protection violation
stemming from the teacher's practice of creating cooperative work groups that assigned
racial minorities in pairs to each group so that no minority student would feel isolated.
The court determined that this issue survived the motion for summary judgment and
required further fact-finding to determine whether the practice violated the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. Id.
The Seventh Circuit's discussion in Billings further illustrates Judge Gertner's obser-
vation that the holdings in Wessmann, Tuttle and Eisenberg may be used to challenge
numerous educational policies that implicate the day-to-day operation of schools. The
following excerpt provides as example of how entangled courts may be asked to become
in instructional delivery:
They maintain that Ms. Zabel treated B.B. differently because of her race
in the classroom seating arrangement: that Ms. Zabel required that African
American and Hispanic students sit in pairs in class. Although Ms. Zabel's
deposition testimony is not without ambiguity, this claim appears sup-
ported by both that testimony as well as her student teacher's testimony.
Not only did Ms. Zabel admit that, at an early period in the school year,
she arranged for minority students to sit in pairs in her classroom, but she
stated that she did so purposefully. Ms. Zabel explained that she utilized
the race-conscious seating arrangement because she believed that African
American students 'need' a partner because 'they view things in a global
manner. ,... In requiring that African American and Hispanic students sit
in pairs, Ms. Zabel may have believed that she was acting in their best in-
terest. Nevertheless, her action was based purely on the race of the
student, and differences in treatment based on race in the classroom must
be regarded as highly suspect .... This record provides no basis for justify-
ing the racially based seating arrangement other than Ms. Zabel's reliance
on a stereotypical notion that African American students 'view things in a
global manner.' No evidence of record indicates that this arrangement was
implemented to rectify past discriminatory conduct that had left its effect
on these students. On this record, without any justification other than Ms.
Zabel's stereotypical notion as to how African American children learn,
her action cannot be justified, and, consequently, summary judgment is
inappropriate. It may be that, in further proceedings, Ms. Zabel will be
able to explain in a more satisfactory manner the reasons for her adoption
of the racially based buddy system seating plan. Perhaps her decision was
based on her professional assessment that, because of past discriminatory
practices, students in this particular school had difficulty in adjusting to a
racially diverse educational environment. However, we cannot accept as
adequate her conclusory explanation.We must decide the case on the re-
cord before us.
Id. at 814-15 (citations onitted).
This passage also suggests that the Seventh Circuit, along with some of the courts
analyzed in this article, has not adequately considered the difference between retrospective
relief and prospective educational policy in equal protection analysis in public school set-
tings, further demonstrating the need for the U.S. Supreme Court to provide guidance on
the issue.
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
Interestingly, however, the arguments that schools' goals for diversity
in student body composition are inextricably tied to curricular policy
discuss the curriculum only in terms of its broad goals.There was no at-
tempt to directly tie race-conscious student selection to the fulfillment of
specific curricular goals, such as a social studies or multicultural curricu-
lum.' One possible explanation is that no such ties existed. More likely,
the omission originates from the fact that these goals have become so
commonplace, educators assume that they are general knowledge and im-
plicitly understood as part of those broad goal statements, thereby
requiring no explicit description.Yet, the Wessmann, Tuttle, Eisenberg, and
Hampton courts, in their seeming attempts to separate diversity from the
curricular goals of the schools involved, suggest that the connections that
are obvious to educators are not so apparent to the judiciary.' As will be
argued in the next section, tying these policies to explicit curricular goals
may aid in successfully surviving the narrow tailoring analysis that forms
the second component of strict scrutiny.
190. For example, the Madison Metropolitan School District of Madison, Wisconsin
lists the following objectives, among others, as part of its eighth grade social studies
curriculum; all of which could be used to demonstrate the emphasis on diversity as an
explicit matter of curricular control:
[a] Describe the cultural contributions of racial, ethnic and religious
groups in the United States. [b] Explain how slavery impacts American
history. [c] Give specific examples and explain how the arts, literature, and
media influence and reflect societal values and perspectives of historical
events. [d] Identify how Americans have worked to reform society.
[e] Identify institutions that influence the behavior and decision-making
of individuals and groups in American history. [fl Explain how beliefs and
practices about race, age, socio-economic status, and gender may lead to
conflict between people of different regions or cultures and give examples
of such conflicts that have or have not been resolved in American history.
[g] Illustrate the importance of multiple viewpoints for understanding
people, events and issues. [h] Empathize with people of different historical
periods, places, and backgrounds. [i] Make connections and look for pat-
terns with the understanding that most issues encountered in social
studies are complex, need thoughtful analysis, and may lack simple solu-
tions. [j] Survey and appraise the role of leadership throughout the course
of United States history (e.g., political leaders, economic innovators, social
reformers). [k] Give examples to explain how factors such as family, gen-
der, race and socioeconomic status contribute to one's own identity and
development.
MADISON METROPOLITAN SCH. DIST., GRADE LEVEL PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: GRADE
EIGHT: THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES: INDIVIDUALS, INSTITUTIONS, SOCIETY, at http://
www.madison.k12.wi.us/tnl/socia105.htm#eight (last updated Feb. 9, 1999).
191. Wessmann, 160 E3d at 796-800; Tuttle, 195 F3d at 705-06; Eisenberg, 197 F3d at
130-33; Hampton, 102 F Supp. 2d at 377-81.
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c. Diversity as a Tool to Address and Combat
Effects of De Facto Segregation
The third definition of diversity relates to its application as a method
of addressing and combating the effects of defacto segregation. Although
related to the first two definitions, this conception of diversity became
central to those cases examining inter- and intra-district transfer pro-
grams.'92 This focus on de facto segregation is an obvious extension of the
purpose of the programs in connection with earlier desegregation litiga-
tion or states' efforts to avoid such litigation through the structuring of
various voluntary integration plans. As Judge Heyburn wrote in Hampton,
"[t]he very analysis for dissolving desegregation decrees supports contin-
ued maintenance of a desegregated system as a compelling state
interest."'93
For example, the facts giving rise to the dispute in Ho include the
judicial history of earlier findings of intentional de jure segregation in the
San Francisco Unified School District. Perhaps, the most surprising aspect
of that case is that the school district seemingly did not try to forcefully
connect current efforts to current defacto segregation, where state intent is
not an issue."' Rather, the district relied solely on the consent decree as
its justification for the policy. Accordingly, the court's analysis focused di-
rectly on whether current problems can be properly termed vestiges of
the intentional discrimination that originally motivated the consent de-
cree. The decision included no discussion about whether the district
might have a proper motivation in maintaining the integration gains made
under the consent decree by avoiding the negative consequences of
allowing the district to return to segregation, albeit defacto and not dejure.
Likewise, both the Wessmann9 5 and Hampton'96 courts analyzed
whether the race-conscious selection processes at issue could be justified
as remedies for "vestiges" of past discrimination. Taken together, the three
cases, Ho, Wessmann and Hampton, demonstrate the difficulties defendant
school districts encounter when using the term, "vestiges," as it obligates
192. Ho, 147 E3d 862-65; Brewer, 212 F3d at 749-53; Comfort, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 65-68;
Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d at 1235-36.
193. Hampton, 102 E Supp. 2d at 380.
194. See NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 59 E Supp. 2d 1021, 1034-35
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (reviewing a settlement agreement and noting that the research by Gary
Orfield indicated that the school district was likely to resegregate if race could not be
considered in making student assignments.That discussion centers only on the causal con-
nection of "current problems in the SFUSD" to "governmental race discrimination that
justified the adoption of the Consent Decree in 1983" without touching on the issues of
addressing the contemporary problems associated with racial isolation regardless of its
cause).
195. 160 E3d at 795.
196. 102 F Supp. 2d 358.
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the reviewing court to scrutinize the issue of causation and the
structuring of "remedies." '97 In other words, the analysis turns to the past,
even though the school district's focus is not on the past, but the future.
Education, because of its function and purpose, is future-oriented. 9 ' In
that sense, educational policy-makers are less concerned with the cause of
racial isolation and more interested in addressing its effects and in making
certain that children are not educational casualties of the social
phenomenon of racially isolating housing patterns.'99 Districts with
voluntary integration policies make no attempt to change demographic
patterns, but attempt to create educational environments that seek to open
minds about and to offset the effects of those patterns - to challenge and
to be certain that those patterns are not determinative of opportunity.As
such, the policies are not designed as "remedies" in the legal sense of the
word as "the means of enforcing a right or redressing a wrong; [providing]
legal or equitable relief."2°° Rather, they are remedies in a more generic
sense, as "means of counteracting ... evil."2 ' This pertinent distinction in
framing the compelling governmental interests with a focus on
prospective goals rather than retrospective relief was apparent in Parents
Involved."2 Particular care to frame the discussion toward addressing the
"effects" of defacto segregation,"3 and not attempting to combat the racial
197. "Most of the intervenors' complaints suffer as a constitutional matter from an
absence of causation ... Intervenors introduced no evidence of actual, tangible racial dis-
crimination within the school system ... Though the Intervenors raised many thought-
provoking educational issues, none is of constitutional significance," Hampton, 102 F Supp.
2d at 358. See also Ho, 147 F3d at 865; Wessmann, 160 E3d at 804.
198. In Brown, the Supreme Court stated: "Today, education is perhaps the most impor-
tant function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment." Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
199. See Hampton, 102 E Supp. 2d at 373. Note the discussion in Hampton of whether
the consent decree under which the Jefferson County Board of Education operated in-
cluded a requirement of "eliminating the county's racial demography" and whether the
school district "can practicably do [anything] to eliminate that demography" Id. The
court's discussion never touches on the issue of whether it is proper for the district to
create educational policy to address the effects of the racial demography, irrespective of
whether that policy might have future (though certainly attenuated) consequences for the
longstanding residential patterns themselves. Id.
200. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1296 (7th ed. 1999).
201. FUNK AND WAGNALLS NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY Of THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1065 (Comprehensive Edition 1997).
202. 137 E Supp. 2d at 1234-39.
203. Id. at 1233-39.
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isolation itself, shifted the discussion away from issues of causation and
legal remedies and toward educational policy and curricular control.2 0, In
fact, the court repeatedly used the term "integration-positive" to describe
the policies used by the school district, thereby concentrating on the
future orientation and the educational benefits for all children of
integrated learning environments °. 2 1
Given the ties of these choice programs to the country's efforts to
more fully integrate its schools, the inter- and intra-district programs
debated in Brewer, Comfort, and Parents Involved also employ the most
explicit racial criteria, often, though not always, to the exclusion of other
factors. 2 6 Although such explicit use of a racial criterion may create a
higher burden under strict scrutiny, the decisions in all three cases suggest
that it does not necessarily doom the programs on constitutional grounds.
As the United States Department of Justice brief points out, such
programs have even been encouraged through Congressional action. 27
Chief among these actions is the Magnet School Assistance Program 20 8
(MSAP) passed by Congress in 1984 to continue the integration goals
first codified and funded under the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972.209
Congress reauthorized MSAP in 1994. To demonstrate the need for this
legislation, Congress found that "magnet schools are a significant part of
our Nation's effort to achieve voluntary desegregation in our Nation's
schools."'2 0 In addition, proponents of race-conscious plans point to other
204. See Comfort, 100 F Supp. 2d at 65, n.12.The Hampton court's search for constitu-
tional causation effectively extinguished the educational arguments Intervenors made in
support of the policy. Hampton, 102 F Supp. 2d at 388.
205. Thro, supra note 22, also misses this distinction. He consistently discusses school
district policies as remedies in the legal sense of the word, thereby ninimizing the goal of
the policies, which is to create learning environments focused on the benefits they provide
for the future.
206. For example, in Comfort, other factors taken in consideration included siblings
attending the same school, safety, medical needs, hardships due to day care situations, and
classification of bi-racial and multi-racial students. 100 E Supp. 2d at 61.
207. Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States at 20-22, Brewer v. West Irondequoit
Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000) (No. 99-7186).
208. 20 U.S.C. § 7201-7213 (1994).
209. Ch. 36, § 702-720,86 Stat. 354 (1972) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1601).
210. 20 U.S.C. § 7201(1).The Act also states that
it is in the best interest of the Federal Government to: (A) continue the
Federal Government's support of school districts implementing court-
ordered desegregation plans and school districts seeking to foster mean-
ingful interaction among students of different racial and ethnic
backgrounds, beginning at the earliest stage of such students' education;
(B) ensure that all students have equitable access to quality education that
will prepare such students to function well in a culturally diverse, techno-
logically oriented, and highly competitive global community; and
(C) maximize the ability of local educational agencies to plan, develop,
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federal legislation that provide funds for specific educational purposes tied
to classifications of students by income, language, gender, race, and
national origin. For example, such programs include the following:2"
Bilingual Education Program2 2  (language); Emergency Immigrant
Education Program 213 (national origin); Indian, Native American, and
Alaska Native Education Program 2t '(race); Project Head Start215 (income);
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act216 (income); and
Women's Educational Equity Act 217 (gender).
The role of voluntary parental-choice programs in the prevention of
defacto segregation has also been highlighted in various briefs in support
of such programs. As one group of organizations argued in support:
[Concluding that race-conscious plans violate the Constitu-
tion] interprets the equal protection clause to require
schools to assume legal and financial responsibility for cur-
ing the immense adverse consequences that segregation
causes but to prevent schools from voluntarily taking race
conscious action aimed at preventing the development of
racially isolated schools before the separation and inequities
become so intense that judicial intervention is necessary to
remedy them. To declare this to be the state of the law defies
all logic.21
8
The defiance of logic also received attention in Parents Involved. The
court in Parents Involved pointed out that these voluntary measures are far
less restrictive than the bussing plans courts approved in the 1970s: "Ab-
sent a Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit directive on point, it would defy
logic for this court to find that the less intrusive programs of today violate
the Equal Protection Clause while the more coercive programs of the
implement, and continue effective and innovative magnet schools that
contribute to State and local systemic reform.
Id. § 7201(5).
211. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Association of School Administrators et al. at
16-19, Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-1604)
(listing programs using criteria similar to those by Arlington County Public Schools).
212. 20 U.S.C. 5 7402.
213. Id. § 7541.
214. Id. 7401.
215. 42 U.S.C. 9831 (2000).
216. 20 U.S.C. 6301.
217. Id. § 7231.
218. Brief of Amici Curiae American Association of School Administrators et al. at 20,
Tuttle v.Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 E3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-1604).
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1970s did not."21 9 In contrast, both Belk and Hampton appear to suggest
that the race-conscious mechanisms used to enable a school district to
achieve dissolution of a consent decree could not be assumed to be con-
stitutional the day after dissolution.2 2 ' However, as mentioned earlier, both
Belk and Hampton miss the simple fact that actions taken pursuant to a
consent decree are retrospective legal remedies that become removed only
through a process of comparing the present to the past.Voluntary integra-
tion policies, in contrast, are prospective policies designed to affect
children's futures by addressing the present. The reasoning of the Belk 221
and Hampton222 courts neglects the idea that as one goal is successfully ob-
tained through race-conscious means, another equally compelling goal
may be served by continuation of the same means.
Another point concerning diversity as a compelling state interest must
be noted.These ten cases exemplify a judicial reluctance to draw any con-
clusion about whether schools' interest in diversity (regardless of definition)
rose to the level of a compelling state interest. Of the seven courts that di-
rectly addressed the issue of diversity, five left the question unanswered as a
"maybe" 23 In these situations, the courts assumed for the sake of argument,
without deciding, that diversity satisfied the compelling state interest re-
quirement.24 In these cases,judicial focus then turned to the second prong
of the strict scrutiny analysis-the narrow tailoring analysis. 25
219. Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d at 1235. Relatedly, Peter Rubin argued that school
districts have the authority to use racial criteria for purposes of drawing school attendance
zones as no child has a right to attend any particular school and no child is denied an
education as a result and that such actions would clearly survive constitutional scrutiny
Rubin, supra note 22, at 38.
220. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 233 F3d 232,276 (4th Cir. 2000) [here-
inafter Belk I]; Hampton, 377 F Supp. 2d at 361.
221. Belk II, 269 F3d at 355.
222. 377 F Supp. 2d at 379.
223. See infraTable 11.
224. Cf Boger, supra note 27, at 1744 (tracing Supreme Court precedent and conclud-
ing that "in nearly half a dozen decisions rendered over a twelve-year period-Swann,
Bustop, Keyes, Bakke, and Seattle School District No. 1-the Court itself or various of its Jus-
tices gave express approval and constitutional sanction to the voluntary use of race by
states or local governmental agencies to achieve ends of educational diversity").
225. See Wessmann, 160 F3d at 807-08; Tuttle, 195 F3d at 705-07; Eisenberg, 197 E3d at
131-33; and Hampton, 102 F Supp. 2d at 378-81 (hinging their decisions on the narrow
tailoring analysis). But see Brewer, 212 F3d at 753 (holding that the district court had erred
by not properly conducting the narrow tailoring analysis and remanding the case for ap-
plication of the analysis to the goal of reducing defacto segregation); Comfort, 100 F Supp.
2d at 65-69 (not actually applying strict scrutiny, but providing direction to the parties as
they prepared for a full trial on the issue).
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
2. Application of Strict Scrutiny-Tailoring the Means
As illustrated by the same four cases, Wessmann, Tuttle, Eisenberg, and
Hampton, a court may well conclude that, despite compelling goals, the
policy fails because it is not narrowly drawn sufficient to satisfy constitu-
tional standards. Strict scrutiny requires examination of both the ends and
the means of a policy. Upon a state's articulation of compelling ends, the
necessary and narrowly tailored" portion of strict scrutiny shifts exami-
nation to the means employed by the policy. The Wessmann court
described the narrow tailoring analysis as an inquiry into "whether the
concrete workings of the Policy merit constitutional sanction. Only by
such particularized attention can we ascertain whether the Policy bears
any necessary relation to the noble ends it espouses. In short, the devil is
in the details. 2 26 Therefore, in applying the narrowly tailored analysis,
courts examine whether other means, without employing racial classifica-
tions, could achieve the same ends.
As noted in the discussion on the various courts' examination of the
compelling state interest standard, Hunter proved to be unique among
these cases. UCLA's goal, for which race-conscious student selection was
the means, emanated from its research mission.2 7 When the scrutiny
shifted to fitting the means to those ends, the university was able to suc-
cessfully demonstrate how controlling the variable of race was necessary
and narrowly tailored to the university's compelling interest in conducting
valid and reliable educational research. 228 This argument was in many ways
a simpler line of reasoning to defend than the arguments presented in the
other cases. The university argued that the lab school existed as a place to
conduct social science research and, therefore, the university needed only
to demonstrate scientific rationales for controlling variables in that re-
search. As a result, the uniqueness of Hunter's context limits its precedential
value for more traditional school environments where race-conscious stu-
dent selection policies are in force or being considered. 229
226. Wessmann, 160 F3d at 798.
227. Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F3d 1061, 1062 (9th
Cit. 1999).
228. Id. at 1066-67.
229. It is conceivable, that a school district may wish to create or charter a school in
order to "test" an innovation to determine if it has merit for its other schools. In that con-
text, officials might be able to make the argument that they also need to replicate the
racial/ethnic composition of the school district as a whole in order to realistically test the
innovation and determine whether to transfer its use to other contexts. Universities with
charter school authority make likewise wish to replicate Hunter's laboratory approach.
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All four courts that found plans unconstitutional did so on the basis
of this portion of the analysis. 23" Three cases found fault with what they
termed the central means employed, so-called "racial balancing." 23' The
First Circuit condemned the process, noting, "[i]t cannot be said that ra-
cial balancing is either a legitimate or necessary means of advancing the
lofty principles recited in the Policy' 232 The Fourth Circuit was even
more direct, declaring that "nonremedial racial balancing is unconstitu-
tional."233 The Fourth Circuit grounded this assertion with a reference to a
quotation from the Supreme Court's decision in Freeman v. Pitts, establish-
ing that "[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake."234Yet, the
Second Circuit's decision in Brewer makes note of the fact that the First
and Fourth Circuit's reliance on Freeman may be misplaced, as the logic of
such reliance appears to ignore the distinction between a duty to correct a
racial imbalance and voluntary efforts to achieve the same end. 23s
Careful examination of the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in this regard
suggests the presence of some circular reasoning. Racial balancing, if you
accept the court's characterization of those programs, becomes both the
ends and the means. School officials argued that racial balance was not
targeted for its own sake, but for the compelling state interest of creating
diverse learning environments as curricular policy. And yet, the court's
analysis ignores this difference, effectively severing the means from the
educational ends.
Thorough inspection of Tuttle's narrow tailoring analysis reveals this
flaw.236 The Fourth Circuit framed its analysis with a five-part test based
on the Supreme Court's ruling in US. v. Paradise37 and later applied by the
230. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 807-08; Tuttle, 195 F3d at 705-07; Eisenberg, 197 F3d at
131-33; Hampton, 102 F Supp. 2d at 378-81.
231. Wessmann, 160 F3d at 799; Tuttle, 195 E3d at 707; Eisenberg, 197 F3d at 131.
232. Wssmann, 160 F3d at 799.
233. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705.
234. Id. (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,494 (1992)).
235. Brewer, 212 F3d at 752 ("The absence of a duty sheds little light on the constitu-
tionality of a voluntary attempt.").
236. As Tuttle was the only decision to frame its narrow tailoring analysis with a "test,"
that test will likewise be used to frame the comparative analysis here.This approach is also
used because cases that found policies unconstitutional after Tuttle cited Tuttle as persuasive,
if not controlling, authority on the issue. See Eisenberg, 197 F3d at 131. Ho and Wessmann,
two cases that chronologically preceded Tuttle, did not devote extensive analysis to this
portion of the test. Ho merely touched on the issue by identifying the questions necessary
for resolving the dispute on remand. 147 F.3d at 865.The Wessmann opinion concentrated
the majority of its analysis on the compelling state interest portion of the test. But see 160
E3d at 828-31 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (employing the same factors in his narrow tailoring
analysis). See also Belk I, 233 E3d at 307-308 (TraxlerJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (employing the Paradise test).
237. 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (finding a 50 percent promotion requirement for African
American troopers adopted to racially integrate the Alabama state police force a constitu-
tional remedy to findings of discriminatory hiring and promotion).
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Fourth Circuit in Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Association.238
The court examined "(1) the efficacy of alternative race-neutral policies,
(2) the planned duration of the policy, (3) the relationship between the
numerical goal and the percentage of minority group members in the
relevant population or work force, (4) the flexibility of the policy, includ-
ing the provision of waivers if the goal cannot be met, and (5) the burden
of the policy on innocent third parties. 
239
a. Efficacy ofAlternative Race-neutral Policies
The Tuttle court's discussion of the first factor, the efficacy of race-
neutral alternatives, notes that the committee in advising the school board
on admissions policies listed three race-neutral options. 24" However,
existence of race-neutral policies does not satisfy the first factor of the
test, which requires the court to examine the "efficacy" of those
alternatives. 241 A determination of efficacy necessarily requires analysis of
the means in relation to the ends, not cut adrift from them.Yet, nowhere
does the Tuttle court engage in an examination of the effectiveness of the
proffered alternatives and whether any or all had the potential to effect
the same ends. Although the opinion is unclear concerning the process
used, it can be assumed that the committee in determining which
alternative to recommend did engage in some sort of deliberation
concerning the potential effectiveness of each policy alternative.
24 2 All of
the alternatives listed, 243 including the weighted lottery, which was
238. 10 E3d 207,213 (4th Cir. 1993).
239. Tuttle, 195 F3d at 706.
240. Id. at 706, n.11.
241. In contrast, see discussion of alternatives for the committee's ability to achieve the
stated goals. Wessman, 160 E3d at 831 (Lipez,J., dissenting).
242. Note the following discussion from Tuttle: "Fortunately, we need not engage in
judicial policymaking today because the School Board's own Alternative Schools Admis-
sion Study Committee offered one or more alternative race-neutral policies in its Report
to the Superintendent.While the Committee ultimately recommended the currently chal-
lenged Policy, the fact that the Committee also proposed one or more race-neutral
alternatives demonstrates that the School Board has race-neutral means to promote diver-
sity." Tuttle, 195 E3d at 706.The court recognizes the presence of alternatives but engages
in no analysis of their relative strengths or weaknesses. Nor does the court report any ra-
tionale for the committee's ultimate recommendation.
243. The alternatives included: (1) assign each school a geographic home area and
reserve seats from that area with remaining seats filled through a lottery of applicants;
(2) place all students of entering classes in a school into a lottery and select students at
random until a sufficient number accept the offer of an available seat in that school;
(3) guarantee each neighborhood school a number of seats at each alternative or magnet
school with the number of slots to be determined by the extent of overcrowding at the
school. Presumably if applicants outnumbered seats available, a lottery would determine
entering students. Tuttle, 195 F3d at 706, n. 11.
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eventually selected, relied in some measure on random drawings. What
distinguished the selected policy was the addition of weights that, while
they did not guarantee any child a seat, did increase the chances of
selection for children who came from low-income families, who spoke
English as a second language, or who were racial minorities in the district.
None of the other alternatives had any "controls" for what might be
termed diversity factors, effectively requiring that the district leave its
curricular policy of creating diverse learning environments to chance.
The school board clearly determined that its commitment to provid-
ing the educational benefits of racially and ethnically diverse classrooms to
all children required more than a reliance on the luck of the draw. Thus,
the board's approach essentially asked for parents to volunteer their chil-
dren to aid in the espoused ends and used the inducement of magnet
schools to attract students from diverse backgrounds. Then, to ensure that
granting a particular transfer would not undermine the purpose for grant-
ing the ability to apply for a transfer in the first place, the district created a
procedure by which to increase the odds of selecting students such that
parents' preferences and the district's goals coincided. While parents may
have had multiple reasons for wanting their child to attend a particular
school (a commitment to diversity, the magnet focus, academic reputation,
proximity to work or childcare, or family tradition), the district, ultimately,
had only one predominant purpose, and it took the necessary steps to
ensure that its goal drove the selection process. Even though the Fourth
Circuit did not analyze any alternative with respect to the intended goal
of the policy, it considered the alternative methods preferable to the care-
fully considered selection of the district. This conduct reveals precisely the
judicial conceit that the Supreme Court cautioned against when review-
ing educational policy.24 Clearly the Tuttle court, despite its protestations
to the contrary,24 ' engaged in educational policy-making from the bench.
b. Policy's Planned Duration
The Tuttle court next looked at the planned duration of the policy
and faulted the policy for having no logical stopping point. The policy
governed the "1999-2000 school year and thereafter."246 Evidently, the
court had hoped to see an explicit date set for stopping the weighted
244. See, e.g., State ex rel. Andrews v.Webber, 108 Ind. 31, 8 N.E. 708 (Ind. 1886); Sch.
Dist. ofAbington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973); Bd. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176,207 (1982). But see, Wessnann, 160 E3d at 797, n.3.
245. Tuttle, 195 E3d at 706.
246. Id. The inquiries directed by the Ho court on remand also reflect attention to
time.The inquiries directed by the Ninth Circuit in Ho suggests that a program that with-
stands scrutiny at its inception may not fare so well at a later date in time if forecasts of the
effectiveness of the means prove false. Ho, 147 F3d at 865.
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lottery and concluded that its absence meant the procedure would be
employed "in perpetuity " '2 However, this analysis ignores the implicit
stopping point found in the race-conscious lottery weights. Once siblings
of currently attending students were admitted, the policy dictated that the
procedure only be used when the applicant pool deviated more than 15
percentage points from the composition of the county-wide student body.
In other words, if the applicant pool fell within the prescribed range, an-
off switch-was automatically triggered and the practice stopped. This
procedure ensured that race-conscious procedures would be used only on
an as-needed basis, irrespective of some arbitrary calendar date. Judge
Rothstein explained this approach in Parents Involved:
Plaintiffs claim there is no "end point," or "sunset provision,"
but the integration-positive tiebreaker applies only to
schools deemed out of balance. Once a school is considered
in balance ... the board will abandon the use of race in its
assignments to that school. In addition, under the newly-
revised plan, the district switches off the racial tiebreaker as
soon as an entering class comes into balance, and will not
use race to assign the remaining spaces in that school.248
This thinking also recognizes the pivotal distinction discussed earlier
between prospective and retrospective compelling state interests. In the
context of retrospective remedies, a one-time "endpoint" or sunset provi-
sion makes sense. The provision provides the time when the remedy has
cured the original problem and no further treatment is needed. In con-
trast, when reaching for prospective goals, a one-time cure to a problem is
no longer applicable. Rather, a "switch" that employs a mechanism for
prospective ends when needed is more relevant from a public policy
standpoint. Thus, if the goal of an integrated learning environment can be
met without attention to race during school admissions, use of race be-
comes unnecessary and the switch is turned off. If the goal cannot be met,
then and only then is the switch turned on and race considered, as it is
necessary to achieve the goal. Such use of a racial criterion does not grant
unfettered discretion to school officials, but ties the use of a racial crite-
rion exactly to the goal that motivates it.
247. Tuttle, 195 F3d at 706.
248. Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d at 1238; Accord Wessmann, 160 E3d at 829 (Lipez,J.,
dissenting) ("While it is not 'self terminating' in an involuntary, mechanical sense, nothing
about this race preference implies permanence in the sense of the Supreme Court's gen-
eral warning against 'remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in
their ability to affect the future.' ") (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
276 (1986)).
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c. Relationship Between the Numerical Goal and the Percentage of
Minority Group Members in the Relevant Population
The third factor guiding the Fourth Circuit's tailoring analysis exam-
ined the "numerical goal" and the "percentage of minority group
members in the relevant population or work force." '2 49 The Tuttle court
declared that the means amounted to "racial balancing," and that "[t]he
Policy's two goals, to provide students with the educational benefits of
diversity and to help the School Board better serve the diverse groups of
students in its district, do not require racial balancing.""' Yet, the court
made no attempt to provide a rationale for its declaration.
It is interesting to compare the Tuttle analysis on this point with that
used in both US. v. Paradise2s' and Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement,2s2
two cases cited as precedent. In Paradise, the Court assessed this factor:
We must also examine the relationship between the numeri-
cal relief ordered and the percentage of nonwhites in the
relevant work force. The original hiring order of the District
Court required the Department to hire 50% black applicants
until 25% of the state trooper force was composed of blacks;
the latter figure reflects the percentage of blacks in the rele-
vant labor market. The enforcement order at issue here is less
restrictive: it requires the Department to promote 50% black
candidates until 25% of the rank in question is black ...
Thus, had the promotion order remained in effect for the
rank of corporal, it would have survived only until 25% of
the Department's corporals were black. 253
Here, the Court seemed to approve of the mathematical relationship
between the promotion percentage and the minority representation in the
"labor market."Yet, the Fourth Circuit rejected a similarly related range
directly tied to the minority representation of the student population in
Tuttle.2s4 In Hayes, the court declared unconstitutional the policy that
granted the Chief of Police the discretion to promote any eligible police
officer, where eligibility was determined by a series of tests and
249. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 707.
250. Id.
251. The analysis here sets aside for the moment the distinct difference that Paradise
concerned the limits of a judicial order rather than a voluntary effort to integrate schools
and whether this fact makes any precedent set by Paradise applicable in the school context.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149.
252. 10 E3d 207 (4th Cir. 1993).
253. 480 U.S. at 179 (citations omitted).
254. Tuttle, 195 E3d at 707.
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interviews, based on any factor he believed "relevant. 2 ' Although this
policy, like the Arlington School District's, was voluntary as opposed to
court-ordered, it shared none of the safeguards established by the school
district's procedure, such as no reserved seats, a built in "off switch," and
submission to random selection to allow every child to compete for every
seat. Still, the Fourth Circuit considered these "distinctions without
differences."2"6
In contrast, the Parents Involved court specifically cited similar fea-
tures25 7 of that district's policy as reasons why the policy did not "mandate
a specific racial quota" and therefore survived this portion of scrutiny.
28
Similarly, the Wessmann dissent explains that this narrow tailoring element
"assures that the beneficiaries of any program will be qualified, thereby
minimizing the cost of the preference to society while assuring that the
favored applicants are not unjustly enriched. 2 9 Judge Lipez concluded,
therefore, that the admissions policy for the Boston Latin School that se-
lected some students by means of proportional representation had "clearly
been structured to meet this qualification requirement. "
60
d. Flexibility of the Policy
The next element of the Paradise analysis considers the policy's flexi-
bility. In this instance, the Tuttle panel rejected the district's claims of
flexibility,21 concluding instead that the policy erred because it did not
consider each applicant as an individual in contravention of Bakke.262
While more will be discussed about individual rights in the next section,
this conclusion comes without examining flexibility in relation to the
policy's goal. Rather, as with all the other factors, the court discussed
flexibility for its own sake, without reference to what purpose flexibility
255. 10 E3d at 213 (stating "Chief Stone testified that he gave preference to African
American officers pursuant to the consent order, which required the goal of 20% African
American sergeants, and because of his 'belief that the Charlotte Police Department should
be integrated and be reflective of the community at large, both in terms of police officers
as well as the supervisors: in order to increase the effectiveness of the police force through
enhanced cooperation and support from the citizens of Charlotte").
256. Tuttle, 195 F 3d at 707.
257. The policy allowed a 15% deviation from its overall student composition of 40%
white and 60% non-white. Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d at 1238-39.
258. Id.
259. 160 E3d at 829.
260. Id.
261. AgainJudge Lipez reached the opposite conclusion in his dissenting opinion in
Wessmann, citing as evidence of flexibility the procedural variance produced by the yearly
changes in the composition of the applicant pool. Id.
262. Tuttle, 195 F3d at 707.
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should serve. 263 In contrast, for example, the Comfort court identified one
simple indicator of flexibility never addressed by the Tuttle court-the fact
that no child "is forced to transfer against his or her will.'"2 64 Only when
considering the purpose of the race-conscious procedure itself, and the
purpose for the granting of parental choice in the first instance, can one
see that voluntariness 25 itself adds flexibility to the policy
266
e. Burden on Innocent Third Parties
The final element considered under the Paradise/Hayes analysis is the
burden of the policy on "innocent third parties."The Fourth Circuit iden-
tifies Tuttle's "innocent third parties" as "young kindergarten-age children
like the Applicants who do not meet any of the Policy's diversity crite-
ria. '267 The court then comments on the irony of teaching about race by
being conscious about race.268 No further analysis ensues, leaving undis-
cussed any identification of the burden borne by these children.
Presumably, the court concluded that denial of their applications was of
itself sufficiently burdensome and required no further discussion. The
Wessmann court made a similar assumption about the Boston Latin School
admissions procedure, explaining, "[e]ven though we may not know be-
fore the fact which individuals from which racial/ethnic groups will be
affected, we do know that someone from some group will be benefited
and a different someone from a different group will be burdened.""26
Other courts engaged in what might be termed a more nuanced ex-
amination of what loss was suffered by those denied requested transfers.
The Hampton court considered what it termed horizontal and vertical
resource allocation."' In the first instance of horizontal transfers, such as
transferring from one traditional elementary school to another, the court
263. In Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Equal Opportunity Comm'n, Justice Powell dis-
cusses the flexibility of the court's mandated remedy to be sure that the remedy did not
become an end unto itself but maintained fidelity to the purpose for which it was im-
posed. 478 U.S. 421, 486, (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Likewise, the majority opinion in Paradise ties flexibility to "fairness:" See also Paradise, 480
U.S. at 188.
264. Comfort, 100 F Supp. 2d at 67.
265. Here, it is necessary to recognize the voluntariness on the part of the parent in
participating in the program, as well as the school district in developing the program in
the first place.
266. Kevin Brown further illustrates this point, writing: "Thus if the parents or the
student prefer not to be affected by government use of racial classifications to promote
integrated student bodies, they simply need not apply to the affected school." Brown, supra
note 181,at 79.
267. Tuttle, 195 F3d at 707.
268. Id.
269. Wessmann, 160 E3d at 794.
270. See discussion infra Part I.H.
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reasoned that denial did not constitute a burden because the programs
were fungible and, thus, the denied student lost nothing but the choice. In
contrast, the Hampton court considered denial of entry into a magnet
school program a denial of "vertical resource allocation" since magnet
schools provide a type of value-added program. The Comfort court sug-
gested that this difference may also be revealed in whether the program is
race-preferential or race-conscious, the first being more difficult to justify
than the second.27 1 Similarly, the Parents Involved court differentiated
between "reshuffle" and "stacked deck" programs.112 Reshuffle programs
integrate an existing group, while stacked deck programs "confern a gov-
ernment benefit to members of a minority group at the expense of those
of the majority.' 273 These three cases, unlike Tuttle, examined the burden in
connection with, not separated from, the program's purpose.
The Wessmann dissent points out another salient factor that should
enter into any discussion of burdens borne by plaintiffs. That is, "[r]ather
than being removed from a superior school because of a racial preference,
Wessmann was denied the opportunity to move from a good school to a
better school. There is no constitutional right to attend a school of one's
choice."2 4 In fact, when analyzing the plaintiff's claim that the open
choice policy of Parents Involved violated the state constitution and stat-
utes, that court expressly rejected the characterization of that program as a
"preference.12 7 The court found it within the proper discretion of the
school board to determine that "it cannot provide an equitable and di-
verse educational opportunity to the district as whole without depriving
some students of access to their first choice' -2 7 6
It is also instructive to further examine the notion that a child is
simply denied a choice. A child is neither denied an education, nor asked
to delay an education. Wessmann, Tuttle, Eisenberg, and Hampton all charac-
terize this denial as a burden and correspondingly, the granting of a
choice as a benefit.'77 However, these conclusions all misapprehend the
difference between a benefit and an inducement. All of the programs un-
der scrutiny here, with the exception of Hunter, are more accurately
classified as inducements. Unlike the programs in colleges and universities,
these procedures do not exist simply to control access to a particular aca-
demic program. Rather, the programs create an incentive to encourage
271. Comfort, 100 E Supp. 2d at 67.
272. 137 F Supp. 2d at 1230 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. San Fran-
cisco Unified Sch. Dist., 616 E2d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1980)).
273. Id.
274. Wessmann, 160 E3d at 830.
275. Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d at 1232.
276. Id.
277. Wessmann, 160 E3d at 794; Tuttle, 195 E3d at 707; Eisenberg, 197 F3d at 133; and
Hampton, 102 F Supp. 2d at 381.
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parents to enroll their children in a school the child would not otherwise
attend. In essence, they reward parents and their children for their willing-
ness to enroll the child in an integrated setting, even if the parents have
other reasons for doing so. The reward is either the ability to make a
choice of schools (inter- and intra-district choice programs) or the choice
coupled with a particular instructional focus (magnet school programs).
In Hampton, Judge Heyburn's understanding of vertical rewards ne-
glects this grounding in the program's purpose. He also misinterprets the
importance of the lack of"fungibility" between magnet schools and more
traditional schools. 78 While it is true that magnet schools adopt method-
ologies and content concentrations that mark them as unique in order to
attract their students, the differences are relative, not absolute as they are in
the higher educational setting. In fact, much of the curriculum and the
targeted outcomes from one school to the next are comparable. All
schools must adhere to the same outcome measures as established by state
and local curriculum standards and all must be tested by the same tests to
hold schools accountable to those standards. No district claims or, more to
the point, no plaintiff claims that the non-magnet high schools graduate
less-prepared students. And unlike an aspirant to a college or university
program, no plaintiff claims that a student who aspires to be a doctor must
attend a magnet school with medicine as its focus. These choices were
created by the school district to craft an attraction over and above the
benefits of integrated education that might motivate parents and students
who otherwise might be reluctant to attend an integrated school. That
school authorities create programs that give parents an appealing reason
based on the curriculum to select the school in order to further the dis-
trict's objective of integrated education cannot be dismissed from the
analysis.
As discussed earlier, the disconnect of the Tuttle panel's analysis of the
policy's means from the educational goals they address stems from the
court's limited view of the concept of diversity as an extension of the
right to free speech.279 The Brewer court, in discussing the district court
decision it reviewed, explained the impact of this misconception on the
narrow tailoring analysis:
We recognize that the District Court did conduct a narrow
tailoring analysis."' We believe, however, that it focused on
278. Hampton, 102 F Supp. 2d at 380.
279. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
280. "[T]he Program as applied is anything but narrowly tailored ... The Program does
little to achieve anything other than seek some type of facial diversity ... Furthermore,
because so few students are accepted into the Program even this flawed goal is suspect.The
introduction of a handful of minority students into a suburban school that is substantially
white does little to reduce so-called racial isolation." Brewer v.West Irondequoit Cent. Sch.
Dist., 32 F Supp. 2d 619,632-33 (WD. N.Y 1999).
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the wrong question: the District Court asked whether the
Program is narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of "true di-
versity," when the appropriate inquiry, as evident from our
discussion in the preceding sections, is whether the Program
is narrowly tailored to achieve its primary goal of reducing
racial isolation resulting from defacto segregation.The differ-
ence in these two frameworks is not mere semantics. If
reducing racial isolation is standing alone a constitutionally
permissible goal, as we have held it is ... then there is no
more effective means of achieving that goal than to base de-
cisions on race. "True diversity," on the other hand, may
certainly be defined more broadly than race. Indeed, the
cases cited by the District Court in support of its decision
that the use of race alone in the Program was not narrowly
tailored, ... (Wessmann, Bakke, and Hopwood), only address
the efficacy of employing strictly racial classifications to
achieve "true diversity." Those decisions are, therefore, inap-
plicable to the present situation where the Program's aim, as
initially found by the District Court and affirmed by this
Court today, is precisely to ameliorate racial isolation in the
participating districts. 2 1
As this excerpt illustrates, the narrow tailoring analysis must examine
the fit between the ends and the means. Therefore, a clear understanding
of how diversity, as an end, is defined becomes essential.282 Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit's refusal to countenance the curricular goals of the district
while conducting the narrow tailoring analysis transmuted means into
ends with no further analysis.
Another problem with the Fourth Circuit's analysis is that it demon-
strates the problems attendant with trying to wrench the square peg of
educational facts into the round hole of an analytic framework developed
from the employment context. Both Paradise and Hayes involved efforts to
remedy past discrimination in police force personnel decisions. In Paradise,
those efforts were court-ordered, while in Hayes they were voluntary.283
However, both were in place to offset problems associated with past
exclusion of African Americans from law enforcement ranks. Those facts
differed markedly from those presented to the Tuttle court or to the other
cases under examination here. The educational efforts present in the ten
disputes are voluntary and occur in an instructional context where the
281. 212 F3d at 752-53 (citations omitted).
282. Recall that the Brewer court remanded the case because the court below had not
conducted a narrow tailoring analysis with the goal of reducing de facto segregation in
mind. Id. at 753.
283. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 163; Hayes, 10 E3d at 211.
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benefits of diverse educational environments are so readily apparent that
no major educational policy-making organizations supported the plain-
tiff's claims, while several supported the district's goals as amici.284
Establishing sound educational policy is markedly different than
determining hiring and promotion practices. Ignoring those differences
neglects the fact that such a test may not "make the transition from the
employment to the educational contest gracefully; education, after all, is
directed at shaping individuals in a prospective manner."'285
3. Summary of the Application of Strict Scrutiny
This section has reviewed the courts' application of strict scrutiny in
race-conscious student selection processes. Analysis reveals three distinct
iterations of the concept of diversity as a compelling state interest moti-
vating the use of race: (1) diversity as an extension of the right to free
speech; (2) diversity as an extension of the district's curricular control; and
(3) diversity to address and combat the effects of de facto segregation.
Likewise, a review of the courts' narrow tailoring analysis demonstrates
the impact of clearly articulating which conception of diversity provides
purpose to the race-conscious means employed. In addition, the impor-
tance of prospective rather than retrospective justification becomes
apparent.
C. Courts' Use of Supreme Court Precedent
As the judges rendering decisions in these cases were quick to point
out, the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case that considers the limits of
local and state school authorities in the use of race-conscious student se-
lection processes at public elementary and secondary schools.2 86
Accordingly, the courts examined the Supreme Court's precedents in
other instances where race-conscious mechanisms were used for state de-
cision-making. Although not a complete compilation of all Supreme
Court precedents cited, five cases figured most strongly in the judges' cal-
culus including: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,8 Richmond v.JA. Croson
Company,28 Wygant v.Jackson Board of Education,2 9 Regents of the University
284. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
285. Wessmann, 160 E3d at 829 (Lipez,J., dissenting) (referring to the factor of numeri-
cal goals).
286. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d at 1234; Tuttle, 195 E3d at 705.
287. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
288. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
289. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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of California v. Bakke, 29" and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion." '
Beyond supporting the proposition that strict scrutiny formed the
relevant analytic framework and defining that framework,292 Adarand, the
most recent of the five cases, did not prove very instructive to the cases at
bar. However, the following rebuke penned by Justice O'Connor regard-
ing courts' application of the test was used by the Hampton court to
demonstrate that selection of the analysis did not necessarily predict the
outcome of its application:
[WMe wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in
theory' but 'fatal in fact.' The unhappy persistence of both
the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination
against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate re-
ality, and government is not disqualified from acting in
response to it.2"3
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education also played a small,
but pivotal role in the reasoning of some courts.294 Dicta, quoted earlier..
from Swann, appeared to provide courts with a demarcation point from
which to explore the discretion of school boards in making voluntary
efforts toward integration. The quote stood for the assertion that even
though a court may be constrained in its efforts to order desegregation,
school districts may employ race-conscious measures as discretionary edu-
cational policy. However, one should note that the Wessmann court
remained unpersuaded and cautioned that:
[T]he Swann dictum, properly construed, recognizes that a
low percentage of minority students in a particular school
does not necessarily betoken unconstitutional conduct ...
This well-accepted principle does not help the School
Committee. The Swann Court had no occasion to consider
290. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
291. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
292. See Ho, 147 F3d at 864; Wessmann, 160 E3d at 794; Tuttle, 195 F3d at 703;
Eisenberg, 197 F3d at 129; Hunter, 190 F.3d at 1063; Brewer, 212 F3d at 745; Hampton, 102 E
Supp. 2d at 377; and Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d at 1232.
293. Hampton, 102 E Supp. 2d at 377 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237). Accord Wessmann,
160 F3d at 828 (Lipez,J., dissenting).
294. Swann was more central to the consideration of the dispute in Belk v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education. Belk II, 269 F.3d 305. However, that reliance was most dis-
positive on the issue of the petition for dissolution, not in the court's consideration of the
race-conscious selection processes used in the school district's magnet schools. Id. at 317-
35.
295. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16. See also supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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the question, central to this appeal, of whether and to what
extent the Constitution circumscribes school officials' dis-
cretion to formulate and implement an admissions policy
that embraces a particular brand of pluralism. 296
Croson, Wygant and Bakke played a larger role in the courts' reason-
ing, either relying on principles enunciated by the Court or distinguishing
the precedents from the case at bar. Courts cited Croson for three central
premises. First, Croson was referenced to assert that the burden of justifica-
tion of any state use of race falls on the government, not the challenging
party.29 Second, as the First Circuit noted in Wessmann, to meet this bur-
den, Croson directed reviewing panels to require government officials "to
muster a 'strong basis in evidence' 298 showing that current social ill in fact
has been caused by [past intentional discrimination]. 29' Extending this
reliance, the Wessmann court then read this admonition to mean that only
the most rigorous research is sufficient to demonstrate causation, and that
judges must resist attempts to equate correlation with causation.3 " Judge
Boudin, in his concurrence, strongly suggested that conclusions based
upon qualitative research methodologies3 "1 would be insufficient to satisfy
Croson's directive to engage in "searching judicial inquiry' 30 2 as such re-
search relies on "general statements or anecdote."30 3 The third proposition
courts took from Croson was the Supreme Court's rejection of "a 'gener-
alized assertion' of past discrimination and present effects" as sufficiently
compelling to meet the burden of persuasion since it "provides no guid-
ance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it
seeks to remedy.3 4 As Judge Beezer explained in his dissent in Hunter
"Not only does such a theory lack any connection to 'the kind of prior
discrimination ... that would justify race-based relief, but also it 'could be
296. Wessniann, 160 F.3d at 797.
297. Ho, 147 F3d at 865.
298. Wygant was also cited for the proposition that a "strong basis in evidence" defined
the defendants' burden of persuasion. Hunter, 190 F.3d at 1073 (Beezer,J., dissenting).
299. Wessmann, 160 F3d at 800 (citing Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,500 (1989)).
300. Id. at 804 (referring to Croson, 488 U.S. at 504).
301. Qualitative research is defined as "any kind of research that produces findings not
arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification. It can refer
to research about persons' lives, stories, behavior, but also about organizational functioning,
social movements, or interactional relationships." ANSELM STRAUSS & JULIET CORBIN, BASICS
OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: GROUNDED THEORY PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 17 (1990). It
was this type of research that was employed by the school district's expert witness,William
Trent, and rejected by the court as insufficiently rigorous. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 805-806.
302. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
303. Wessmann, 160 F3d at 809.
304. Ho, 147 F3d at 865; Croson, 488 U.S. at 498. See also Brewer, 212 F.3d at 751.
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used to justify race-based decisionmaking essentially limitless in scope and
duration.' "30
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit in Brewer, the Ninth Circuit in
Hunter, and the District Court in Parents Involved soundly rejected Croson
as controlling authority. All three agreed that the holding in Croson shed
no light on the issue of non-remedial goals serving as compelling state
interests.3"6 The Brewer court recognized that "the danger identified by the
Supreme Court as inherent in non-remedial based programs is not present
when a local school board acts to remedy clearly identifiable, indeed ob-
vious, racial isolation in particular school districts.130 7
As might be expected, the courts' use of Wygant followed similar pat-
terns. In addition to adding further weight to the concepts gleaned from
Croson for requiring a "strong basis in evidence" and for rejecting societal
discrimination as "too amorphous" to justify race-conscious decision
making, courts read Wygant for two related propositions. 38 First, several
courts noted the Supreme Court's strong rejection of the "role model"
theory as a justification for the race-based teacher lay-off provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement at issue in Wygant. °9 Second, the Eisenberg
court used Wygant as a source of direction in the application of the nar-
row tailoring analysis, referencing the Court's characterization of this
305. Hunter, 190 F3d at 1070 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 497-98).
306. Brewer, 212 E3d at 748; Parents Involved, 137 E Supp. 2d at 1233. See also, Hunter,
190 F.3d at 1064, n.6 (explaining Croson has "no bearing on the question whether a non-
remedial interest, such as the operation of a research-oriented elementary school dedicated
to improving the quality of education in urban public schools, can serve as a compelling
interest sufficient to survive strict scrutiny").
307. Brewer, 212 E3d at 751 (internal citation omitted); see also Parents Involved, 137 E
Supp. 2d at 1233-34 (reasoning cited with approval).
308. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276-77.
309. As the Supreme Court explained:
The role model theory announced by the District Court and the resultant
holding typify this indefiniteness. There are numerous explanations for a
disparity between the percentage of minority students and the percentage
of minority faculty, many of them completely unrelated to discrimination
of any kind. In fact, there is no apparent connection between the two
groups. Nevertheless, the District Court combined irrelevant comparisons
between these two groups with an indisputable statement that there has
been societal discrimination, and upheld state action predicated upon ra-
cial classifications. No one doubts that there has been serious racial
discrimination in this country. But as the basis for imposing discrimina-
tory legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal
discrimination is insufficient and over-expansive. In the absence of par-
ticularized findings, a court could uphold remedies that are ageless in
their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future.
Id. at 276. See also Brewer, 212 F3d at 751; Hunter, 190 E3d at 1070 (BeezerJ., dissenting);
Hampton, 102 F Supp. 2d at 369, n.26.
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procedure as the search for the "most exact connection" between the
state's ends and means.31
Even those courts that eventually found in favor of defendant school
districts also found Wygant instructive, particularly Justice O'Connor's
concurrence. O'Connor's narrowing of the plurality's ruling proved espe-
cially relevant where she clarified:
[C]ertainly nothing the Court has said today necessarily
forecloses the possibility that the Court will find other gov-
ernmental interests which have been relied upon in the
lower courts but which have not been passed on here to be
sufficiently 'important' or 'compelling' to sustain the use of
affirmative action policies."'
The Parents Involved court noted Justice O'Connor's explanation
concerning which party bears the burden of persuasion in cases challeng-
ing "reverse discrimination:' commenting that once the governmental
agency provides a rationale for its actions, the burden reverts to the plain-
tiffs to establish that unlawful discrimination has occurred.3 2 The
Wessmann dissent also pointed out that the Wygant Court factored the
nature of the injury suffered into its narrow tailoring analysis by noting
that the loss of a job creates a more intrusive burden than the use of hir-
ing preferences.31 3 The dissent analogized that difference to the difference
between denial of an education and denial of a choice and reasoned that
such a distinction must play a role in the tailoring calculus for race-
conscious student selection processes.
310. Eisenberg, 197 E3d at 129.
311. 476 U.S. at 286, quoted in Brewer, 212 E3d at 748. See also Parents Involved, 137 E
Supp. 2d at 1233.
312. Parents Involved, 137 E Supp. 2d at 1236, n.10. "In 'reverse discrimination' suits, as
in any other suit, it is the plaintiffs who must bear the burden of demonstrating that their
rights have been violated.The findings a court must make before upholding an affirmative
action plan reflect this allocation of proof and the nature of the challenge asserted. For
instance, in the example posed above, the nonminority teachers could easily demonstrate
that the purpose and effect of the plan is to impose a race-based classification. But when
the Board introduces its statistical proof as evidence of its remedial purpose, thereby sup-
plying the court with the means for determining that the Board had a firm basis for
concluding that remedial action was appropriate, it is incumbent upon the nonminority
teachers to prove their case; they continue to bear the ultimate burden of persuading the
court that the Board's evidence did not support an inference of prior discrimination and
thus a remedial purpose, or that the plan instituted on the basis of this evidence was not
sufficiently 'narrowly tailored.' Only by meeting this burden could the plaintiffs establish a
violation of their constitutional rights, and thereby defeat the presumption that the Board's
assertedly remedial action based on the statistical evidence was justified*" Wygant, 476 U.S.
at 292-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See also
Wessmann, 160 E3d at 816 ( Lipez,J., dissenting).
313. Wessmann, 160 E3d at 830 (discussing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-83).
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Distinguishing Wygant from the cases at bar also rested on the same
differences that distinguished Croson. Namely, that education is a very dif-
ferent context from those heretofore addressed by the Court rendering no
previous Supreme Court decision sufficiently analogous to the issues pre-
sented by these situations. As summarized by the First Circuit in Brewer:
Neither case, however, involved desegregation of a student
population in the public school system, a goal that we may
assume at this point in the proceedings is more compelling
than reduction of racial isolation or underrepresentation in
the commercial context-teachers' jobs and the construc-
tion industry-at issue in Wygant and Croson.3"'
Turning to the courts' use of the Supreme Court's decision in Bakke,
some might assume that defendants who succeeded in convincing jurists
that their race-conscious programs survived strict scrutiny did so by rely-
ing on this seminal higher education case as controlling. Although courts
found some of the issues in Bakke directly applicable, distinguishing Bakke
from the controversies under examination became an important linchpin
in successful legal arguments in support of school district discretion. First,
it is enlightening to examine those issues for which courts found Bakke
directly applicable. Several courts noted that Bakke established that diver-
sity may be compelling in an educational context, but did not resolve the
question." ' Courts also understood Bakke to require rejection of programs
that used race as a single criterion for decision-making3 '1 6 or that used ra-
cial quotas or racial balancing.3"7 Finally, both the First and Fourth Circuits
cited Justice Powell's caution against using racial stereotypes. As the Fourth
Circuit explained:
314. Brewer, 212 E3d at 751.
315. However, none were moved to follow the Fifth Circuit and declare Bakke no
longer good law. The Fifth Circuit came to that conclusion in Hopwood v Texas, 78 F3d
932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996). The First Circuit assumed arguendo that Bakke is still good law.
Wessmann, 160 F3d at 796. The Second Circuit also assumed that Bakke's conclusion re-
garding diversity remains valid. Brewer, 212 E3d at 747. The Fourth Circuit assumed
without deciding that diversity could be compelling. Tuttle, 195 E3d at 705; Eisenberg, 197
F3d at 131.The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky made the same
assumption. Hampton, 102 F Supp. 2d at 378. For discussions critical of the Hopwood deci-
sion and its reading of Bakke, see Phillip T.K. Daniel & Kyle Edward Timken, The Rumors
of My Death have been Exaggerated: Hopwood's Error in "Discarding" Bakke, 28 J.L. & EDUC.
391 (1999); Mark R. Killenbeck, Pushing Things up to Their First Principles: Reflections on the
Values of Affirmative Action, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1299, 1361 (1999). But cf., Michael E. Rosman,
The Error of Hopwood' Error, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 355 (2000).
316. Hampton, 102 F Supp. 2d at 378-9; Wessmann, 160 F3d at 798; see also Bakke, 438
U.S. at 315.
317. Tuttle, 195 F3d at 705.
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In Bakke, Justice Powell explained that constitutionally per-
missible programs such as the Harvard College admissions
program promote diversity by 'treat[ing] each applicant as an
individual in the admissions process.' The Policy [at issue in
Tuttle], like the Davis admissions program in Bakke, does not
treat applicants as individuals. The race/ethnicity factor
grants preferential treatment to certain applicants solely be-
cause of their race.
31 8
No court countered this notion that student selection processes vio-
lated the individuality of the child by using race as one means of
decision-making. 31 Rather, the courts enunciated the differences in the
school cases in order to show the limitations of the precedent set in Bakke
and avoided the necessity of applying the concepts of "plus factors" and
individual rights over group interests. First, courts pointed to the obvious
-that the programs at issue did not happen in a higher education context
and therefore could not be analogized to seeking entry into medical
school.2 In some judicial opinions, judges drew attention to the fact that
children are merely denied a choice, not an education. 32' Also, as described
above, courts noted that Bakke considered only one type of diversity-
"true diversity"-and therefore could not be read to control programs
with purposes to address the effects of defacto segregation.3 22
In summary, there was no uniform application of Supreme Court
precedent in the ten cases reviewed here. Nonetheless, the five major cases
examined by the courts, Swann, Bakke, Wygant, Croson, and Adarand, and
the principles discerned from them, provided insight into successfully
challenging or successfully defending race-conscious student selection
processes.
D. Use of Social Science Research
The final pattern apparent in these cases is the reliance of the courts
on social science research. Continuing a practice first exemplified in
Brown v. Board of Education,323 the parties, amici, and courts all looked to
social science research for evidence that a policy used race to serve
318. Id. at 707 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318).
319. An argument will be made to counter this point in the section entitled "Proposed
Legal Argument." See infra Part III.
320. Parents Involved, 137 E Supp. 2d at 1235; Comfort, 100 F Supp. 2d at 60; Brewer, 212
E3d at 751.
321. Brewer, 212 E3d at 751; Wessmann, 160 F3d at 819 (Lipez,J., dissenting).
322. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 752-53; Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d at 1235; Comfort, 100 E
Supp. 2d at 65, n.12.
323. 347 U.S. 483,494-95, n. 11 (1954).
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compelling interests and only when necessary and absolutely justified. 324
Social science research was used in these cases to demonstrate a
compelling state interest and the need for attention to diversity. Similarly,
research played a role in the narrow tailoring analysis to show the efficacy
of the policy under scrutiny and the comparison of the policy's means to
other methods to show that a race-conscious method was the only
effective means available.
As might be expected the research cited predominantly addresses the
benefits of education in a diverse educational environment given our plu-
ralistic society and the harmful effects of racial isolation.32 The Parents
Involved court quoted the school district's expert witness, Dr. William
Trent, a scholar from the University of Illinois, to identify:
[F]our discrete reasons why racial balance at the high school
level is important:
[1.] Opportunity and achievement. The research shows that
a desegregated educational experience opens opportunity
networks in the areas of higher education and employment,
particularly for minority students, which do not develop
when students attend less integrated schools....
[2.] Teaching and learning. The research shows that academic
achievement of minority students improves when they are
educated in a desegregated school, likely because they have
access to better teachers and more advanced curriculum.
The research also shows that both white and minority
students experienced improved critical thinking skills-the
ability to both understand and challenge views which are
different from their own-when they are educated in
racially diverse schools.
324. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People et al. at vii-ix, Brewer v.West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 E3d 738 (2d
Cir. 2000) (No. 99-7186) (listing 17 references to social science research).
325. See, e.g., Brief for Montgomery County Public Schools at ix, Eisenberg v. Mont-
gomery County Pub. Sch., 197 E3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-2503) (citing MaureenT.
Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 OHIo ST. L.J. 733
(1998); J. Braddock II and J. McPartland, Social-Psychological Processes that Perpetuate Racial
Segregation: The Relationship between School and Employment Desegregation, 19 J. BLACK STUD.
3:267 (Mar. 1989)); Brief for Amici Curiae National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People et al. at vii-ix, Brewer v.West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 E3d 738
(2d Cir. 2000) (No. 99-7186) (citing GARY ORFIELD, HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT,
CITY-SUBURBAN DESEGREGATION: PARENT AND STUDENT PERSPECTIVES IN METROPOLITAN
BOSTON (Sept. 1997); Florence Wagman Roisman, Intentional Racial Discrimination and Seg-
regation by the Federal Government as a Principal Cause of Concentrated Poverty:A Response to
Schill and Wachter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1351 (1995)).
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[3.] Civic values.The research clearly and consistently shows
that, for both white and minority students, a diverse educa-
tional experience results in improvement in race-relations,
the reduction of prejudicial attitudes, and the achievement
of a more democratic and inclusive experience for all citi-
zens .... Recent research has identified the critical role of
early school experiences in breaking down racial and cul-
tural stereotypes....
[4.] Employment. Research ... shows that, as a group, mi-
nority students who exited desegregated high schools were
more likely to be employed in a racially diverse workplace,
obtained more prestigious jobs than those who did not, and
that their jobs tended to be higher paying than those stu-
dents who did not attend desegregated schools.
2 6
In the same case, even the plaintiffs' witness, Dr. David Armor,327 Re-
search Professor at George Mason University, "concede[d] that '[t]here is
general agreement by both experts and the general public that integration
is a desirable policy goal mainly for the social benefit of increased infor-
mation and understanding about the cultural and social differences among
the various racial and ethnic groups. '328 In addition, research on the per-
sistent achievement gap between minority and non-minority students was
touted to show the need for creating racially mixed learning environ-
ments.329 Plaintiff's experts did not try to demonstrate the benefits of
racially isolated education; rather, as did Dr. Armor, their testimony sug-
gested that statistical analyses do not support conclusions regarding
causation.33 °
One interesting argument concerning social science research ensued
between the majority and dissenting judges in Wessmann. As in Parents
Involved, the school district had Dr. Trent"' testify as an expert witness to
show the necessity of its race-conscious plan at the Boston Latin School.
Dr. Trent did not conduct original research in Boston. Rather, he applied
the findings of his research in Kansas to the Boston context based on
(1) data the district had collected about the achievement gap between
African-American and White students, (2) data regarding when teachers
326. Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d at 1236 (quoting Trent Decl. 4).
327. See also Belk II, 269 F.3d at 331 (using Dr. Armor's testimony).
328. Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d at 1236.
329. See discussion accompanying supra notes 48-59 (referring to Dr. William Trent's
research in both the majority and dissenting opinions).
330. See e.g., DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW
(1995). See also Orfield, supra note 12 (further discussing this issue of causation and expert
testimony).
331. See also Belk II, 269 F3d 305 at 335 (referencing the use of Dr. Trent's expert re-
port in evaluating the schools' remedial plan).
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had begun teaching in relation to the formerly segregated Boston school
system, and (3) interviews with school officials. 32 Based on the facts pro-
vided, the majority dismissed his testimony as unreliable. The majority
explained:
One difficulty with Dr. Trent's testimony is that it relies on
evidence from one locality to establish the lingering effects
of discrimination in another ... Dr. Trent, however, never
conducted a "climate survey" for the Boston school system.
His conclusions for Boston were based only on a review of
statistical data documenting the achievement gap (basically,
the statistics regarding achievement test results and differing
application and enrollment rates), statistics concerning
teacher seniority, and anecdotal evidence about teacher
attitudes supplied by school officials. When asked on cross-
examination whether the data that he relied on for his
conclusions anent teacher attitudes were scientifically
gathered, Dr. Trent responded in the negative. Dr. Trent thus
freely conceded that the data he used was not of the quality
necessary to satisfy the methodological rigors required by
his discipline. Because Dr. Trent failed to follow his own
prescribed scientific methodology for collecting data on the
one issue central to his hypothesis about achievement gap
causation, the trial court could not credit his conclusions....
An expert witness can only deviate from accepted methods
of scientific inquiry in ways that are consistent with the
practices and usages of the scientific community.33
The dissent took painstaking umbrage with this characterization of
Dr. Trent's evidence. Circuit Judge Lipez explained his disagreement with
the majority:
[Dr.Trent] testified that his conclusions were based on a rea-
sonable methodology in his profession. He evaluated
statistics documenting student performance and teacher his-
tories in the Boston school system. He studied the
observations of a well-trained administrator in the Boston
school system describing teacher performances in the class-
room, the impact of these performances on students, and
faulty attempts to alter teacher attitudes. He knew the his-
tory of segregation in the Boston school system. Seeing
statistics and patterns in Boston that he had observed in
332. See discussion infra Part l,Wessmann v. Gittens.
333. Wessmann, 160 E3d at 804-05.
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other school systems where he had found a link between
student achievement gaps and prior discrimination, he testi-
fied to the probability of such a link in the Boston school
system. He had an adequate basis for making that judg-
ment.334
Judge Lipez further explained that the Wessmann majority's error, in
his view, derived from misconceptions about evidence necessary to estab-
lish the requisite fit between ends and means under strict scrutiny and the
rigors of social science inquiry. He posited:
The majority goes awry because it reads Wygant's require-
ment of a "strong basis in evidence" for an affirmative action
program and Croson's reference to a "searching judicial in-
quiry" into the justification for an affirmative action
program as demands for evidence grounded in quantifiable
social science data rather than human judgments.There is no
such demand in Wygant, Croson or any other Supreme
Court precedent. Numbers are not the only source of the
requisite degree of certainty about low teacher expectations
for minorities and causation. In this case, the extensive ob-
servations of experienced administrators in the Boston
public schools, supplemented by the testimony of a highly
qualified expert who recognized in the Boston public
schools a phenomenon he had studied extensively elsewhere,
were as probative as the statistical surveys and regression
analyses demanded by the majority.35
This argument suggests that because of the rigors of the narrow tai-
loring analysis, courts may be less inclined to accept research that is not
specific to the context in which the policy arose.336 As further support of
this suggestion, note how the court in Comfort addressed the issue:
[D]efendants have offered expert testimony, the affidavit of
Professor Gary Orfield ("Professor Orfield"), premised in
part on social science evidence, that the Lynn Plan is neces-
sary to achieve the educational benefits of preparing
students to live in a pluralistic society. Conversely, Professor
Orfield states that abandoning the Lynn Plan will have "det-
rimental effects" which include an impact on minority
students' academic achievement.
334. Id. at 825.
335. Id. at 833 (footnotes omitted).
336. The Hampton court drew similar conclusions. 102 E Supp. 2d at 366, n.14.
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And his observations are not based on unsystematic ob-
servation of racially mixed classrooms. Rather, they are based
on comparing estimates of the actual student populations of
the Lynn schools (were the plan to be dismantled) with the
fruits of social science research ... Professor Orfield's con-
clusions stem not only from studying the concrete dynamics
of the Lynn Plan, but also from studying Lynn's demo-
graphic make-up."z7
Although the demand for context-specific research arose in the nar-
row tailoring analysis, more general research appeared to be viewed more
positively when used to support the need for the policy's goals at the
compelling state interest stage of the analysis.
III. PROPOSED LEGAL ARGUMENT
Teasing out the patterns discernible in the ten cases under examina-
tion in this article also becomes instructive for those who might be called
upon to justify other race-conscious policies in the future. Taking the les-
sons of these cases to heart, a viable case can be made in support of race-
conscious student selection policies, particularly in a context of parental
choice. The legal argument outlined here attempts to address each of the
faults found with the policies under scrutiny in the cases reviewed. Ac-
cordingly, the argument focuses on prospective rather than retrospective
ends that honor the core mission of public elementary and secondary
schools and school districts. The argument consists of five major points:
(1) No child is denied an education; (2) Choice is granted to parents as a
means to a particular goal; (3) Education for success in a diverse society is
a compelling and specific curricular goal within the discretion of the le-
gitimate policy-making authority of state and local authorities; (4) That
goal is at the center of the public elementary and secondary educational
enterprise; and (5) In today's world, conscious use of race is necessary and
narrowly tailored to that core educational goal.This part discusses each of
these central factors.
A. No Child is Denied an Education
As Justice Marshall stated in his dissent in Wygant, discerning
whether anyone has suffered a constitutional injury "calls for calm, dispas-
sionate reflection upon exactly what has been done, to whom, and
why."3 38 To that end, the first salient point often made by the schools and
337. Comfort, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 66 (note 15 included).
338. Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 286, 303 (1986) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
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their amici bears repeating here. Unlike cases from the higher education
context, no child is required to postpone his/her education by virtue of a
denied request to participate in a choice plan. The bottom line is that no
education is denied and no education is delayed. As established by the
courts in Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central School District, Comfort ex rel.
Neumyer v. Lynn School Committee, and Parents Involved v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1, this difference marks a way to distinguish such "injuries" from
those suffered in by plaintiffs in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Richmond
v. JA. Croson, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., or Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.339 While it is certainly true that a constitu-
tional violation is an injury in and of itself, the reasoning in Wygant34 ° and
United States v. Paradise34' demonstrate that consideration of the burden
borne by the plaintiffs in relation to the state's articulated goals as part of
the narrow tailoring analysis determines, in part, whether any constitu-
tional violation has occurred in the first place. It is difficult to
demonstrate how being told "no" creates a real burden in the lives of the
children whose parents try to overturn schools' denials of requests to
transfer from one school to another.While a preferred program may have
aspects that mark it as academically superior in some respect, it does not
follow that denying the parent's request relegates the child to a substan-
dard educational experience. As discussed earlier,342 even in magnet school
programs, schools share much curricula in common with non-magnet
339. See Brewer, 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000); Comfort, 100 F Supp. 2d 57 (D. Mass 2000);
Parents Involved, 137 E Supp. 2d (WD. Wash. 2001); Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Croson,
488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant, 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
340. "'Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most
searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional guaran-
tees.' There are two prongs to this examination. First, any racial classification 'must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest.' Second, the means chosen by the State to
effectuate its purpose must be 'narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal.'We must
decide whether the layoff provision is supported by a compelling state purpose and
whether the means chosen to accomplish that purpose are narrowly tailored." 476 U.S. at
273-74 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also supra note 282.
341. "Finally, and particularly important, the effect of the order on innocent white
troopers is likely to be relatively diffuse. Unlike layoff requirements, the promotion re-
quirement at issue in this case does not 'impose the entire burden of achieving racial
equality on particular individuals" and does not disrupt seriously the lives of innocent
individuals. Although the burden of a narrowly prescribed promotion goal, as in this case,
is not diffused throughout society generally, the burden is shared by the nonminority em-
ployees over a period of time. As noted above, only qualified minority applicants are
eligible for promotion, and qualified nonminority applicants remain eligible to compete
for the available promotions. Although some white troopers will have their promotions
delayed, it is uncertain whether any individual trooper, white or black, would have
achieved a different rank, or would have achieved it at a different time, but for the promo-
tion requirement." 480 U.S. 149, 188-89 (Powell,J., concurring) (citations omitted).
342. See infra Part 1I and text accompanying note 278.
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schools making any denial relative, not absolute.34 3 Once it is clear that the
"injury" is simply the denial of a choice, narrow tailoring analysis must
weigh that denial against the purposes for which it occurred.
This weighing of injury endured against the legitimate interests of
the school has figured strongly in other rights-based school cases heard by
the Supreme Court. In the seminal students' rights case, Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,344 the Court considered the
proper balance between students' rights to freedom of speech under the
First Amendment of the Constitution and the school's authority. As the
Court explained:
[A student] may express his opinions, even on controversial
subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without
"materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the require-
ments of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school" and without colliding with the rights of others. But
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason-whether it stems from time, place, or type of behav-
ior-materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.34
343. For example, note the following discussion by the Wisconsin Supreme Court of its
definition of equal educational opportunity. "An equal opportunity for a sound basic edu-
cation is one that will equip students for their roles as citizens and enable them to succeed
economically and personally. The legislature has articulated a standard for equal opportu-
nity for a sound basic education in Wisconsin Statute 55 118.30(lg)(a) and 121.02(L)
(1997-98) as the opportunity for students to be proficient in mathematics, science, reading
and writing, geography and history, and for them to receive instruction in the arts and
music, vocational training, social sciences, health, physical education and foreign language,
in accordance with their age and aptitude. An equal opportunity for a sound basic educa-
tion acknowledges that students and districts are not fingible and takes into account
districts with disproportionate numbers of disabled students, economically disadvantaged
students, and students with limited English language skills. So long as the legislature is
providing sufficient resources so that school districts offer students the equal opportunity
for a sound basic education as required by the constitution, the state school finance system
will pass constitutional muster.'Vincent v.Voight, 614 N.W 2d 388, 396-97 (Wis. 2000)
(internal citations omitted). This passage suggests that while differences between schools
are inevitable, schools have common characteristics as required by state legislative standards
that mark their uniformity.
344. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In affirming the rights of students to wear black armbands in
protest over the Vietnam war, the Court determined that students continued to enjoy the
protection of the Constitution even while at public schools as long as no material or sub-
stantial disruption to the educational process resulted. Id.
345. Id. at 512-13 (internal citations omitted).
[VOL. 8:63
Conscious Use of Race
The conclusion that students' rights to freedom of speech might
sometimes be outweighed by the legitimate concerns of school officials
was reaffirmed in Bethel School District v. Fraser46 and Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier.347 As the Hazelwood Court summarized:
We have nonetheless recognized that the First Amendment
rights of students in the public schools "are not automati-
cally coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings," ' 8 and must be "applied in light of the special char-
acteristics of the school environment."349
Those special characteristics of the school environment have also en-
tered into the Court's balancing of interests in cases involving students'
rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court first expressed the need for such weighing of
interests in New Jersey v. TL. 0.3" by explaining:
We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue
in concluding that the accommodation of the privacy inter-
ests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers
and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the
schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement
that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the
subject of the search has violated or is violating the law.
Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend
simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of
the search.35'
The Court reiterated the recognition that the school environment
must factor into Fourth Amendment analysis in Vernonia School District 47J
346. 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (determining that school officials could discipline a student
for making a lewd speech at a school assembly without offending the Constitution).
347. 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that student curricular speech could be controlled
and even censored if reasonably balanced by a legitimate pedagogical concern).
348. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 682).
349. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506); cf New Jersey v.T. L. 0., 469 U.S. 325, 341-
43 (1985).
350. 469 U.S. at 341.
351. Id. The Court further explained its reasoning this way: "This standard will, we
trust, neither unduly burden the efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their
schools nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of schoolchildren. By fo-
cusing attention on the question of reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and
school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable
cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and
common sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard should ensure that the inter-
ests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of
preserving order in the schools." Id. at 342-43.
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v. Acton.112 As Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, made clear, "Fourth
Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights,
are different in public schools than elsewhere; the 'reasonableness' inquiry
cannot disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for children"' 353
Schools' "custodial and tutelary responsibility" likewise grounded the
Court's most recent analysis on the issue, Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 92 v. Earls. s4 In upholding the school district's random
drug screening policy as applied to students participating in extracurricu-
lar activities, the Court reasoned that:
[T]he need to prevent and deter the substantial harm of
childhood drug abuse provides the necessary immediacy for
a school testing policy [even lacking evidence of a local
drug problem]. Indeed it would make little sense to require
a school district to wait for a substantial portion of its
students to begin using drugs before it was allowed to
institute a drug testing program designed to deter drug
use.
355
In addition to First and Fourth Amendment principles, balancing the
special interests of the school environment against a child's constitutional
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment has also come before the Court,
as Justice Scalia referenced in the quotation from Vernonia above. In Goss v.
Lopez," 6 the Court was asked to determine what due process rights a stu-
dent enjoys when faced with a suspension from school of less than 10
days. Again the Court considered the rights of students by balancing them
against the concerns of the school. First, the Court recognized that "[s]ome
modicum of discipline and order is essential if the educational function is to
be performed" and that effective discipline "sometimes require[s] immedi-
ate, effective action" and that suspension can be a "valuable educational
device "'3 7 Second, the Court indicated a desire to avoid "imposing elabo-
rate hearing requirements in every suspension case "'3" Considering these
interests, the Court then concluded that:
Students facing temporary suspension have interests qualify-
ing for protection of the Due Process Clause, and due
process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days
352. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
353. Id. at 656 (emphasis added).
354. 122 S. Ct. 2559, 2565 (2002).
355. Id. at 2568.
356. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
357. Id. at 580.
358. Id.
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or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of
the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explana-
tion of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity
to present his side of the story ... We stop short of constru-
ing the Due Process Clause to require, countrywide, that
hearings in connection with short suspensions must afford
the student the opportunity to secure counsel, to confront
and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or to
call his own witnesses to verify his version of the incident.35 9
All of these students' rights cases, Tinker, Bethel, Hazelwood, TL. 0.,
Vernonia, Earls and Goss, demonstrate that substantial Supreme Court
precedent exists to examine any alleged violation of students' rights
against school's role in society.6 That such precedent exists in First,
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process contexts strongly sup-
ports the notion that such considerations must enter into any Equal
Protection analysis in public elementary and secondary school settings.
Therefore it is appropriate to examine the child's denial of choice in light
of the purposes for which the choice was granted.
B. Choice is Granted to Parents as a Means to a Particular Goal
The second key feature of an argument to support race-conscious
student selection processes in public school choice contexts should be to
emphasize that choice is granted to parents as a means to a particular goal.
As the ten cases reviewed here illustrate, choice is not the goal but rather
the instrument used to realize another goal. The plaintiffs in these cases
try to cast the issue as the denial of a right to participate in a state offered
benefit. "But unfairness ought not be confused with constitutional in-
jury"361 Nothing compels the state or local educational authorities to
grant parents some voice in the school assignment process. Choice is of-
fered to parents to serve an educational end and only those parental
choices that are consistent with that end should be honored.362 As evi-
denced by each of the ten programs under scrutiny, schools use choice
359. Id. at 581-83.
360. As mentioned above, some educational organizations argued in their amicus brief
in Eisenberg that a different, lower standard than strict scrutiny should apply in school equal
protection cases. The proposed argument discussed here does not use the student rights
cases in that manner. Rather than arguing that a lower analytic standard should apply, it is
proposed here that the student rights precedents set in Tinker, Bethel, Hazelwood, TL.O.,
Vernonia, and Goss suggest additional inquiries and considerations should be applied within
a strict scrutiny framework. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
361. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 296 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
362. Parents have multiple reasons for choosing, but it is the effect of that choice and
its match with the district's goals that is dispositive.
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instrumentally to achieve other goals. It is these goals that take prece-
dence. They are the conditions under which the benefit of choice was
granted. As demonstrated by the programs here, parental choice is fre-
quently offered, at least in part, to spur educational integration.363
Consequently, participation in the program presupposes, at a mini-
mum, parental acquiescence to the district's goal of voluntary integration.
It is, thus, proper to deny requests that subvert rather than serve the pur-
pose of the program. Accordingly, a majority student moving to a
predominantly majority school or a minority student transferring to a
predominantly minority school does not serve the purpose of the pro-
gram, no matter how much the student might desire it. When one
volunteers for a program, one volunteers to be used for the purposes of
that program. Even in the magnet school context, this logic holds true.
The very name, "magnet school;' itself stems from a school's ability to
attract students who might not otherwise attend a particular school be-
cause of geography and the racial isolation associated with it.364 Therefore
the existence of the magnet program is inextricably tied to addressing or
avoiding defacto segregation.36
Parents who elect to have their child compete for admission to a
magnet or specialty school or inter-district transfer program must recog-
nize all that they are choosing, including assisting the district's legitimate
and compelling interest in avoiding racial isolation in its schools. In es-
sence, parents volunteer to allow the district to use the race of their child
to create appropriately diverse learning environments for their child and
all the district's children.366 In the same manner that a school designs an
advanced academic program by limiting the class membership to those
that pass an academic bar or that it designs the varsity team roster by set-
ting physical hurdles for entry, it may design a integration program by
limiting enrollment by racial or ethnic distinctions. By not deliberately
manipulating school populations, schools do not abdicate their role as
shapers of social harmony. Rather, by maintaining the status quo of the
neighborhood, schools actively create society.
363. Of these ten cases, only the UCLA lab school did not hold integrated education
as its purpose. Rather it created an integrated educational environment to serve the re-
search purpose of the university. Some may argue that charter school programs exist to
offer choice simply for the sake of choice. However, even charter schools are established as
a means to another end, most frequently, educational innovation, which creates increased
educational accountability. This analysis will not touch on the particular issues of applying
this argument to charter schools because of some unique issues that arise in that context.
For example, for charter schools to be eligible for federal financial assistance under the
Charter Schools Expansion Act, students must be selected using a random lottery when-
ever applicants outnumber available seats. 20 U.S.C. § 8066(l)(H).
364. See discussion infra Part II.
365. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
366. See Brown, supra note 181, at 79.
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The right that the district creates in designing a policy using race is
the right for each student to have the opportunity to learn in an envi-
ronment that mirrors the world they will enter beyond school.The choice
is to attend this enlightened program, not to attend a specific school
building. As these integrative choice programs cannot exist without the
distinctions objected to by the plaintiffs in these cases, plaintiffs are essen-
tially claiming the right to end these programs. They want the choice
absent its purpose; but choice is only offered if one chooses integration.
Understood in this manner, the plaintiffs' complaint is akin to demanding
a position on a football team, but refusing to play football.
The conditional relationship between the offer of parental choice
and the goal of integrated educational environments is another fact that
distinguishes challenges to race-conscious student selection processes from
the facts presented to the Supreme Court in previous non-educational
cases. For instance, the denial in Adarand of a subcontract for building a
highway did not relate to the reason for building the highway. It may also
be argued that the Supreme Court has recognized that other conditional
relationships, even when constitutional rights are implicated, are within
the discretion of school authorities because of the special relationship
schools have with students and the special role schools play in society.
Again, the student's rights cases discussed above provide precedent. In
BethelP67 and Hazelwood,368 the Court concluded that children had the
right to free expression in school-established forums, conditioned on us-
ing the platform for speech in a manner consistent with the school's
educational goals. In Vernonia and Earls, the Court concluded that, because
of the school district's legitimate concerns for safety and its desire to
strengthen its stance on the dangers of drugs and alcohol, it was constitu-
tionally allowable for a school district to condition all extra-curricular
participation on student submission to random urinalysis 69 Following this
analogy to other students' rights cases, one might argue that because of
the concerns about and the educational need for integrated learning envi-
ronments, it is constitutionally allowable for schools to condition parental
choice on agreement to disclose the child's race and allow it to be used
instrumentally to further integration.
C. Education For Success in a Diverse Society is a
Compelling and Specific Curricular Goal
When demonstrating the compelling nature of schools' desire for in-
tegrated learning environments, it first appears prudent to remind any
court of Justice O'Connor's admonition that precedents establishing that
367. 478 U.S. at 685-86.
368. 484 U.S. at 271,273.
369. Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v.Acton, 515 U.S. 646,665 (1995); Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2569.
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correcting past discrimination as a compelling state interest do not "nec-
essarily foreclose" the fact that other goals might also be found to rise to
that level of constitutional import. 7 ° It also should be noted, as have vari-
ous legal scholars, 37 1 that the Supreme Court members, writing as a whole
or as individual justices, have given "express approval and constitutional
sanction to the voluntary use of race by states and local governmental
agencies to achieve ends of educational diversity" in several cases.3 72 Those
cases supporting such a proposition include Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, where the Court distinguishes between court-ordered
and voluntary desegregation efforts, 373 Justice Powell's discussion of diver-
sity in Bakke,3 74 and the four cases that follow.
In Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education,375 then-Justice Rehnquist com-
mented that while the U.S. Constitution would not have compelled the
Supreme Court of California to approve a voluntary integration plan in
Los Angeles, he had "very little doubt that it was permitted by that Consti-
tution to take such action. 376 Justice Powell, in Keyes v. School District No.
1, argued that the Court should abandon its distinction between de jure
and defacto segregation in order to require integration, not simply deseg-
regation.3 7  He further emphasized that "[s]chool boards would, of course,
be free to develop and initiate further plans to promote school desegrega-
tion ... Nothing in this opinion is meant to discourage school boards
from exceeding minimal constitutional standards in promoting the values
of an integrated school experience."378 Kevin Brown notes that Justice
Powell reiterated his view of diversity in education serving as a compel-
ling state interest to the elementary and secondary level when in a dissent
to Columbus Board of Education v. Penick,379 he wrote: "[i]t has been thought
that ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom is a desirable component
of sound education in our country of diverse populations, a view to
which I subscribe."380
370. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286.
371. See Boger, supra note 27; Brown, supra note 181.
372. Boger, supra note 27, at 1744.
373. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
374. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
375. 439 U.S. 1380 (1978). See also Boger, supra note 27; Brown, supra note 181.
376. Bustop, 439 U.S. at 1383. See also Boger, supra note 27, at 1741; Brown, supra note
181, at 41-42; Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d at 1234.
377. Keyes, 413 U.S. 189, 242-43 (1973) (Powell,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). See also Boger, supra note 27, at 1741.
378. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 242. See also Parents Involved, 137 F Supp. 2d at 1234-35.
379. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
380. Id. at 486 (Powell,J., dissenting); Brown, supra note 266, at 10-12. See also Dayton
Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
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In 1982, after considering the case of Washington v. Seattle School
District No. 1,381 the Court again spoke to the issue of school officials' dis-
cretion to create programs to desegregate its schools in the absence of a
judicial order. At issue was Initiative 350, a voter initiative that prohibited
the use of mandatory bussing for integration purposes in Washington's
public school districts. The Court agreed with the Seattle School District
that Initiative 350 violated the Equal Protection Clause. The school dis-
trict argued, and the Court agreed, that since the measure allowed school
officials to exercise their discretion to bus students for a variety of pur-
poses unrelated to integration and foreclosed the practice only when
integration was its target, it created an impermissible racial classification. 2
As the Court explained:
Before adoption of the initiative, the power to determine
what programs would most appropriately fill a school dis-
trict's educational needs-including programs involving
student assignment and desegregation-was firmly commit-
ted to the board's discretion. The question whether to
provide an integrated learning environment rather than a
system of neighborhood schools surely involved a decision
of that sort.38
3
Taken together, these opinions indicate a willingness on the part of
the Court to consider the compelling nature of even non-remedial uses of
race. However, given the examples set by the ten cases reviewed here,
great care should be taken when articulating precisely what non-remedial
state interest motivates the conscious use of race. It should also be clear
that those who wish to justify a race-conscious goal should use consider-
able caution when using the term "diversity." To that end, using the word
"diversity" alone as the descriptor of the compelling state interest for the
policy, given its multiple meanings and applications, seems foolhardy. Ac-
cordingly, as described in the previous section, "diversity," when the term
is used, must be clearly defined to incorporate all its complexities. Recall
that these ten cases utilized three different, but related, conceptions of di-
versity: (1) diversity as an extension of the right to free speech;
(2) diversity as an extension of the district's curricular control; and
(3) diversity to address or combat defacto segregation.
The courts' treatment of these concepts suggests that the Bakke-
esque notion of diversity as an extension of the right to free speech might
best be eliminated from any argument seeking to support race-conscious
student selection processes. First, the notion of "true diversity" muddies
the contexts and masks factors that distinguish elementary and secondary
381. 458 U.S. 457 (1982); see also Brown, supra note 181, at 8-11; Boger, supra note 27.
382. Id. at 470-71 (citing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. at 395).
383. Id. at 479-80.
FALL 2002]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
education from higher education." 4 Second, as demonstrated in Wessmann,
Tuttle, and Eisenberg, using this conception of diversity allows the inference
that policy-makers use race as a proxy for what a child adds to the class-
room conversation thus obfuscating the true rationale for the use of race-
conscious means. While having students from a variety of familial and
cultural backgrounds certainly enriches any discussion, that rationale does
not adequately capture the compelling reasons that often motivate educa-
tional policy-makers to employ race-conscious procedures. Lastly, the facts
associated with a "true diversity" interest appear to hamper survival of the
narrow tailoring analysis. It becomes difficult, if not impossible, to make
the connection that using race in student selections is an essential and
precisely crafted mechanism to ensuring a multiplicity of ideas in the
classroom.38 s
Thus, given the examples of the cases examined here, using the latter
two conceptions of diversity in tandem appears to best capture educa-
tional policy-makers' true interest in the use of race in student selection
processes in choice environments. That is, education for success in a di-
verse society is a compelling and specific curricular goal within the
discretion of the legitimate policy-making authority of state and local
authorities.
First, it goes without saying that the identification of educational
problems and the crafting of measures to address those problems falls
within the purview of state and local policy-makers.386 State and local
educational authorities have long recognized that racial and ethnically
isolated schools do not adequately prepare children for life in the modern
community or workplace. The country as a whole and the workplace in
particular is becoming more, not less diverse.387
Adding to this general knowledge, research shows that considerable
re-segregation has occurred in the last decade and highlights the problem
of defacto racial and ethnic segregation. 8 Therefore, research demonstrates
a tendency toward segregation, not integration, and reveals that active
384. See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
385. See infra notes 279-82 and accompanying text.
386. See State ex rel. Andrews v.Webber, 108 Ind. 31,8 N.E. 708 (Ind. 1886); Sch. Dist.
of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,50 (1973); Bd. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176,207 (1982).
387. U.S. Census 2000.
388. See GARY ORFIELD & NORA GORDON, HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, SCHOOLS
MORE SEPARATE: CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE OF RESEGREGATION (July 2001); GARY OR-
FIELD & JOHN T. YUN, HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN
SCHOOLS, (June 1999); see also James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE UJ. 249
(1999) (discussing some of the problems associated with racial isolation in schools).
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steps are necessary to address the educational effects of this segregation. 389
Those effects and their mirror image, the educational benefits available to
all children in integrated educational environments, 391 provide foundation
for the assertion that separated environments demand an educational re-
sponse.The short-term and long-term advantages for all students of being
in racially integrated learning environments have been well-documented
at all levels of education, 39' with results that show consistency and resil-
iency in findings from setting to setting and context to context. Given the
weight of educational research to support it, it is right and proper for
school officials to conclude that integrated educational environments are
not simply desirable, but necessary to an adequate education in the
twenty-first century.3 92 Or as one group of amici explained,"[m]any school
389. See supra note 388; see also AMY STUART WELLS & ROBERT L. CRAIN, STEPPING OVER
THE COLOR LINE: AERIcAN AMERICAN STUDENTS IN WHITE SUBURBAN SCHOOLS (1997) (sug-
gesting that active steps must be taken to integrate urban areas in order to address the
unequal educational opportunities associated with poverty in those areas); David S.Tatel,
Desegregation Versus School Reform: Resolving the Conflict, 4 STAN. L. & POL'V R-Ev. 61, 68
(1993) (arguing that moves toward decentralizing schools have created conflicts with de-
segregation efforts, but noting that increasing diversity makes "the argument for integrated
schools more, not less compelling").
390. See Michael Kurlaender & John TYun, Is Diversity a Compelling Educational Interest?
Evidence from Louisville, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED 111 (Gary Orfield, ed., 2001); MARGUE-
RITE A. WRIGHT, I'M CHOCOLATE, YOU'RE VANILLA: RAISING HEALTHY BLACK AND BIRACIAL
CHILDREN IN A RACE-CONSCIOUS WORLD 1 (1998); William T. Trent, Outcomes of School
Desegregation: Findings from Longitudinal Research, 66 J. OF NEGRO EDUC. 255 (1997); Jane
Ward Schofield, Review of Research on School Desegregation s Impact on Elementary ad Secon-
dary School Students, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTi-CuLTURAL EDUCATION 597-
616 (James Banks & Cherry A. McGee Banks eds., 1995);Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L.
Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects of School Desegregation, 64 REV. OF EDUC.
RES. 531 (1994); Jomills Henry Braddock, II, Marvin P Dawkins, & William Trent, Why
Desegregate? The Effect of School Desegregation on Adult Occupational Desegregation of African
Americans, Whites and Hispanics, 31 INT'L J. CONTEMp. Soc. 273 (1994); Braddock II &
McPartland, supra note 325; Jomills Henry Braddock II, Robert L. Crain, & James M.
McPartland, A Long Term View of School Desegregation: Some Recent Studies of Graduates as
Adults, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Dec. 1984, at 259; CHRISTINE H. ROSSELL & WILLIS D. HAWLEY,
THE CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1983); MARTIN PATCHEN, BLACK-WHITE
CONTACT IN SCHOOL: ITS SOCIAL AND ACADEMIC EFFECTS (1982); Robert E. Slavin &
Nancy A. Madden, School Practices that Improve Race Relations, 16 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 169
(1979).
391. Seegenerally WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SAPaE OF THE RIVER: LONG-
TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
(1998) (finding long-term positive consequences for students admitted under race-
conscious policies in a study of 28 selective colleges and universities).
392. John Charles Boger articulates it this way:
As the world grows more racially and ethnically interdependent every
year, reasonable educators might well conclude that every child has a
compelling interest in learning more about children of other racial and
ethnic backgrounds. From that exposure, children can see for themselves
the role that racial background plays (or very often, does not play) in
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districts around the nation have concluded that separate is academically
deficient. 3 3
It is important to note here, that this attention is necessary to address
a contemporary problem, not to redress past wrongs.The courts' responses
to the disputes in Ho, Wessmann, Hampton, and Belk all demonstrate the
difficulty in causally connecting current problems to "vestiges of
discrimination." '394 While integration was initially focused on the benefits
to minorities of receiving a higher quality education, it is now seen as
beneficial for all children in preparing them to work in an increasingly
multicultural world. Education's obligation to equip each student for
success in a diverse world makes integration a compelling state interest,
regardless of how the environment came to be as it is today.
As Chief Justice Warren explained in Brown, "education is perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments. 395 The com-
pelling state interest, as asserted here, merely recognizes that policy-makers
at all levels have recognized the ever-present and increasing compulsion
that multi-cultural considerations be a core component of a basic educa-
tion. Federal lawmakers have urged integration on state and local
prompting a child to respond to good literature, think about civic issues,
to work in groups, and to create new solutions for contemporary prob-
lems. Indeed, the pedagogical objective in assuring racially diverse
classrooms seems founded not upon some chimerical stereotype about
what African American children think or how Latino children behave, but
on precisely the opposite view-that all children share many more things
in common than they do differences and that the best device for over-
coming lingering racial suspicions or prejudices is exposure, not
separation.
See supra note 27, at 1765-66.
393. Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards Association et al. at 20, Montgom-
ery County Pub. Sch. v. Eisenberg, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000) (No. 99-1069).
394. Ho, 147 F3d at 865; Wessmann, 160 F3d at 801-02; Hampton, 102 F Supp. 2d 361-
62; Belk II, 269 E3d at 334-35. Jeanne Weiler argues that plaintiffs hoping to continue
court-ordered desegregation should "center on the issue of'educational vestiges,' such as
within-school segregation, differential course availability, and the educational performance
gap between white and minority students'" Jeanne Weiler, Recent Changes in School Desegre-
gation, 133 ERIC CLEARINGHOUSE ON URB. EDUC. DIG. 4 (1998). However, analysis of the
cases here suggests following such advice is fraught with dangers. First, it may be difficult
to sufficiently tie such effects to vestiges of past discrimination to satisfy the rigors of
demonstrating causation in Equal Protection terms. Secondly, when plaintiffs oppose the
district's integration efforts and the district is trying to defend them, as in these cases, rest-
ing an argument on the vestiges of past discrimination requires districts to accept the
political costs of the school district conceding that discrimination continues to affect op-
erations. In the end, it may argued that the cause of the problems Weiler enumerates is less
important than crafting an educational response for the future. Therefore, a prospective
interest appears a better justification.
395. 347 U.S. at 493.
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authorities and have used funding to encourage state efforts to that end.3 6
State level policymakers have codified the importance of education for a
diverse society in a variety of ways, including requiring school districts to
adopt multi-cultural curricula and requiring teachers to demonstrate
multi-cultural understanding as a precondition for licensure.397
These legislative enactments at both national and state levels bolster
the conclusion that education for success in a diverse society is a compel-
ling state interest. It is also important to note that these enactments
occurred, not as a result of concerns for formal discrimination, but given
findings of the importance of understanding the richness of America's
diversity for a successful democracy. In other words, the goal is compelling
even absent any finding of discrimination. As Justice Marshall observed
fifteen years ago," [t]he real irony of the argument urging mandatory, for-
mal findings of discrimination lies in its complete disregard for a
longstanding goal of civil rights reform, that of integrating schools with-
out taking every school system to court. 3 9
8
To further emphasize this point, it would strengthen any argument
for a district to be able to enumerate specific curricular objectives related
to integrated education. Rather than simply describing the broad curricu-
lar aspirations of educating for and about diversity, proponents must go
beyond those statements to include the specific parts of the curriculum
served by such policies.399 Not only would this specificity aid school dis-
tricts in making the case for a compelling state interest, it would affect the
narrow tailoring analysis and could help to demonstrate the crucial role
taking explicit care in student body composition plays in the fulfillment
of educational policy.
396. See discussion infra note 208 and accompanying text.
397. Donna M. Gollnick, National and State Initiatives for Multicultural Education, in
HANDBOOK OF RES. ON MULTI-CuLTURAL EDUC. 44-64 (James A. Banks & Cherry A.
McGee Banks, eds., 1995) (reporting that of 47 states reviewed, 22 had standards for multi-
cultural education in k-12 schools, 21 addressed the issue through standards for accrediting
teacher preparation programs, 14 had related requirements for teacher licensure, and 40
required local districts to adopt multicultural curricula).
398. Wygant, at 305 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
399. As noted above, the natural curricular links would probably be found in social
studies and multicultural curricula. It might even be noted that the policy allows the op-
portunity for students to learn that sometimes individual interests must bow to others'
interests; that no right is absolute and that sometimes the legitimate needs of the collective
will outweigh the rights of the individual just as surely as the converse is true in some
circumstances; and that our Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment provide the
mechanisms by which these interests can be weighed and balanced. See supra note 190.
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D. That Goal is at the Center of the Elementary
and Secondary Educational Enterprise
Another important point that seemed to be implied but not explic-
itly stated in the arguments supporting the programs in these cases is that
the goals at issue are at the core of the educational enterprise. Unlike the
race-conscious policies in employment or even in higher education con-
texts, the goals targeted by these policies directly relate to the reason for
the very existence of the institution. As mentioned earlier, the race-
conscious policies used in Adarand and Croson did not directly relate to
reason the contractors were being sought in the first place. Even in
Wygant, the lay-off provisions at issue, while indirectly related to the
school's mission, do not bear a direct relationship. Schools do not exist to
provide jobs to teachers, but to provide education to students. Even in
higher education institutions, there are differences, not the least of which
is the idea of compulsory education. Elementary and secondary schools
exist to carry out the state's mandatory education requirements.
A majority of states have determined that an important and manda-
tory part of that education is the inculcation of democratic values.4"
Higher education, while certainly related, is not compulsory and occurs
largely because of an individual's desire for further education, not the state's
desire for ensuring a minimal level of educational training. Therefore ele-
mentary and secondary public education is a special context. As Judge
Gertner explained in Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, "[d]iversity
may well be more important at this stage than any other-[as this] is
when first friendships are formed and important attitudes shaped." '40 Ac-
cordingly, education for success in a diverse society is not simply
something desirable public elementary and secondary schools do; it is why
these schools exist. This goal parallels the importance of reading, writing,
or arithmetic, or other traditional subject-centered curricular goals in to-
day's K-12 public schools. 4 2 All are part of properly preparing youth for
adulthood.
The enmeshment of the policy's goal and reason for existence of the
institution also factored into the reasoning of Supreme Court in the stu-
dents' rights cases, Tinker, Hazelwood, Bethel, TL. 0., Vernonia, Earls and
400. Gollnick, supra note 397; see also, Linda Darling-Hammond, Education, Equity and
the Right to Learn, in THE PUBLIC PURPOSE OF EDUCATION AND SCHOOLING 41 (John I.
Goodlad &Timothy J. McMannon, eds., 1997).
401. 62 F Supp. 2d 247, 259 (D. Mass. 1999). See also CARYL STERN-LAROSA AND ELLEN
HOFHEIMER BETTMANN, THE ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE'S HATE HURTS: How CHILDREN
LEARN AND UNLEARN PREJUDICE 1,30 (2000) (pointing out that the advent of school often
brings with it children's "first conscious contact with hate" making it all the more impor-
tant to actively address issues associated with racial isolation and racism).
402. Gollnick, supra note 397.
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Goss. In Bethel, Hazelwood, Vernonia, and Earls, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that individual rights had been outweighed by legitimate
educational concerns of the schools. In each of these cases, it was the edu-
cational mission of the schools that provided the justification for the
intrusion of the state in ways that would not be allowed in non-school
contexts."3 Even in Tinker, where the students prevailed, the Court was
careful to balance the students' rights against the school's interests. The
Court established that whenever student speech results in the material and
substantial disruption of the educational environment, school officials are
justified in curtailing student expression. TL. 0. and Goss further illustrate
the point. In TL. 0., the Court justified moving from a standard of prob-
able cause in searches to one of reasonable suspicion when school
authorities believed it necessary to search students precisely because of a
"legitimate end in preserving order in schools."4 0 4 In Goss, the Court
likewise justified its determination that due process procedures in schools
were not coextensive with judicial forums because of the context in
which they would be applied and the value of suspension as an educa-
tional tool, writing: "To impose in each such case even truncated trial-
type procedures might well overwhelm administrative facilities in many
places and, by diverting resources, cost more than it would save in educa-
tional effectiveness. Moreover, further formalizing the suspension process
and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only make it too
costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part
of the teaching process."4 5 Again, these student rights precedents argue for
recognition of the special environment of elementary and secondary
schools in any Equal Protection analysis.
E. In Today's World, Conscious Use of Race is Necessary and
Narrowly Tailored to that Core Educational Goal
[C]laims that law must be "color-blind" or that the datum of
race is no longer relevant to public policy must be seen as
aspiration rather than as description of reality.This is not to
denigrate aspiration; for reality rebukes us that race has too
often been used by those who would stigmatize and oppress
minorities. Yet we cannot ... let color blindness become
myopia which masks the reality that many "created equal"
403. As Justice Scalia explained in Vernonia, "[Tjhe nature of [State's power over
schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control
that could not be exercised over free adults." 515 U.S. at 655.
404. 469 U.S. at 343.
405. Goss, 419 U.S. at 583.
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have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by
the law and by their fellow citizens."6
Although it is indeed ironic, as the Fourth Circuit noted, ' to use
race consciously in order to be able to teach students that people of all
races have a right to equal opportunities, the sad truth is that in today's
world it is still necessary.4" It is necessary because we have not yet realized
a society in which "datum of race is no longer relevant to public policy.""4 9
First, once the compelling interest is identified as success for education in
a diverse society as a legitimate educational policy response to racial and
ethnic isolation, the link between ends and means becomes more
apparent. Without direct attention to the educational environment,
including the children in it, the curricular goals connected to the policy
are severely compromised.
In addition to the integrated educational environment affirmatively
addressing those goals, the absence of a racially diverse set of classmates
arguably limits the effectiveness of the explicit curriculum being taught.
In order to teach that the "content of [one's] character" ' is not depend-
ent on the color of one's skin or the language spoken in the home or the
money amassed in some bank account, a child needs to meet and mean-
ingfully engage with other children whose mere presence challenges
stereotypes, either those that exist already or those that may form.4 ' Re-
search has shown that curricular efforts alone do not alter racial attitudes
while integrated education does." 2 One of the briefs filed in connection
with Tuttle hints at this argument when it explains:
Students learn as much from their experiences as they do
from what they are told. They can be told that people are
equal regardless of race, but when they learn it from their
406. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
407. Tuttle, 195 F3d at 709.
408. See, e.g., Deborah Waire Post, The Salience of Race, 15 Touro L. Rv. 351 (1999).
409. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327.
410. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, in A CALL TO CONSCIENCE: LANDMARK
SPEECHES OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING,JR. 75 (2001).
411. See Comfort, 100 F Supp. 2d at 65, n. 12; see also supra note 182 and accompanying
text.
412. See Robert E. Slavin & Nancy A. Madden, School Practices that Improve Race Rela-
tions, 16 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 169 (1979). See also James A. Banks, Multicultural Education: Its
Effects on Students' Racial and Gender Role Attitudes, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTI-
CULTURAL EDUCATION 617 (James A. Banks & Cherry A. McGee Banks, eds., 1995).
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own experience, it becomes a life-long lesson rooted in real-
ity and not a mere platitude or an idealistic notion.13
However, the brief does not take the last step of actually noting that
realization of the district's goals would actually be hampered by an inabil-
ity to control the make-up of the educational environment. In other
words, that a diverse student body is necessary in order that the students'
educational environments do not place in doubt the veracity of the ex-
plicit goals of a multicultural curriculum. Leaving the racial and ethnic
makeup of schools, particularly schools of choice, to random chance
places the efficacy of such curricular goals in jeopardy because students
may draw incorrect negative inferences about race based on the presence
or absence of students in the learning environment. Even facial diversity
(what children see when they look around the classroom) plays a role in
how children learn. For example, John Dewey linked the teacher's spoken
instruction with the educational environment in which it was presented:
With respect to the training of habits of thought, the
teacher's problem is thus two fold. On the one side, he needs
... to be a student of individual traits and habits; on the
other side, he needs to be a student of the conditions that
modify for better or worse the directions in which individ-
ual powers habitually express themselves. He needs to
recognize that method covers not only what he intention-
ally devises and employs for the purpose of mental training,
but also what he does without any conscious reference to it-
anything in the atmosphere and conduct of the school that
reacts in any way upon the curiosity, the responsiveness, and
the orderly activity of children ... There is always a tempta-
tion for the teacher to keep attention fixed upon a limited
field of the pupil's activity ... When the teacher fixes his at-
tention exclusively on such matters as these, the process of
forming underlying and permanent habits, attitudes and in-
terests is overlooked. Yet the formation of the latter is the
more important for the future. The other side of this fact is
that the teacher, while fixing attention upon the specific
conditions that seem to affect learning of the immediate les-
son before the class, ignores the more general conditions
that influence the creation of permanent attitudes, especially
413. Brief of Amici Curiae American Association of School Administrators et al. at 11,
Tuttle v.Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-1604).
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the traits of character, open-mindedness, wholeheartedness,
and responsibility.1
4
Simply put, children learn from their environments, not just their
teachers. In fact, research has shown that classroom discussions of race
produce limited weak effects on children's thinking, while interaction
between students of different races produce strong effects and hold the
most promise for improving attitudes about race.4"' It is necessary then, in
today's world, to ensure that students do not infer lessons counter to the
actual goal of learning about racial equality. When those inferences are
reinforced by the broader culture (such as, television, print media, the
prevalence of hate groups), as they arguably are today, then the curricular
aspirations of a multicultural curriculum seem extraordinarily limited, if
not destined to fail. Likewise, the ability of educators to challenge
countervailing assertions about race that children encounter in non-
school environments is severely compromised. Since these curricular
goals, by definition, seek to teach and reinforce cardinal principles of
democracy and challenge the status quo of general societal racism, ' their
success demands direct and explicit attention to both the educational
"speech" in the form of what is taught, and also the environment in
which it is taught. Otherwise, the state and local school officials risk
creating environments that cultivate rather than cure stereotypes.
Therefore, policies that seek to ensure racially diverse learning
environments are both necessary and narrowly tailored to the fulfillment
of compelling curricular objectives.
An illustrative example may further elucidate this point. Children are
taught that all people can achieve with desire, industry and opportunity.
But if children attending an urban or suburban math and science magnet
school notice that African-American or Hispanic children are noticeably
absent from their environment, they may incorrectly infer that "those"
people cannot do math and science. If that inference is then reinforced by
what they hear adults say outside of school and what they observe on the
television whenever an "expert" is called upon to explain math and sci-
ence,' 4 the fact that their teachers tell them all students can succeed in
difficult subjects will hold little sway on their thinking.
414. JOHN DEWEY ON EDUCATION: SELECTED WRITINGS 231-32 (Reginald D. Archam-
bault ed., 1974).
415. Slavin & Madden, supra note 412, at 177-79.
416. This discussion uses societal racism to include all forms of racism whether histori-
cal, individual, or institutional.
417. See generally JEFF COHEN & NORMAN SOLOMON, THROUGH THE MEDIA LOOKING
GLASS: DECODING BIAS AND BLATHER IN NEWS MEDIA (1995) (noting the pattern of using
White males as experts on all major television news programs).
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The Supreme Court has recognized the tendency of children to
learn that which schools do not wish to teach and the importance of the
context of children's learning. For example, in Grand Rapids v. Ball, the
Court explained the concern for carefully examining issues related to
state establishment of religion occurs because children's "experience is
limited and whose beliefs consequently are the function of environment
as much as of free and voluntary choice."41 ' While the holding in Ball has
since been overruled,419 this reasoning forms the basis for the endorse-
ment analysis used to discern the presence or absence of Establishment
Clause violations in K-12 settings and was recently applied in Board of
Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens420 and Santa Fe v. Doe.42'
That test asks not only what the state intends to convey, but also what
children are likely to conclude. 2
Another reason such policies are necessary relates to the inadequacies
of random selection from a pool of voluntary applicants. True, if random
selection processes produce the desired environment, the need for race-
conscious programs evaporates. '23 However, research would suggest that
such an assertion is an ideal yet to be realized in most locations as research
regarding who participates in parental choice programs, particularly in the
magnet school context, demonstrates that reliance on random selection
process will likely not produce a pool reflective of the larger population
because minority parents, particularly those who are poor, are less likely to
choose.4 24 Therefore, truly open enrollment with random selection will
create greater racial isolation because the pool from which students are
selected will likely have under-representations of racial and ethnic mi-
norities within the district's student population.4 25 In fact, studies of
unrestricted choice in other contexts have demonstrated a tendency for
418. 473 U.S. 373,390, n.9 (1985).
419. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530,2556 (2000).
420. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
421. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
422. See Julie K. Underwood & Julie E Mead, Establishment of Religion Analysis: The
Lemon Test or Just Lemonade? 35 J.L. & EDUC. 55 (1996) (discussing this test and other Es-
tablishment Clause analyses used in school cases).
423. Recall that one problem with the Boston Latin School policy noted by the Wess-
mann court was that a policy based on merit alone produced almost the same results as a
race-conscious policy.
424. WHO CHOOSES? WHO LosEs?: CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE UNEQUAL EFFECTS
OF SCHOOL CHOICE (Bruce Fuller et al. eds., 1996);Amy Stuart Wells, The Sociology of School
Choice: Why Some Win and Others Lose in the Educational Marketplace, in SCHOOL CHOICE:
EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE 29 (Edith Rasell & Richard Rothstein eds., 1993); Philip TK.
Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis of Educational Choice: Can the Polemic of Legal Problems be
Overcome? 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 1,33-35 (1993).
425. See supra note 424.
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such choices to result in more racial separatism, not less.426 Local patterns
of who chooses and who does not would also provide further support for
the necessity of controlling choices in order to achieve the objectives for
providing the choice in the first place.
Furthermore, the necessity of such attention, lest racial isolation
results, is an important factor to include in any argument supporting race-
conscious plans in a school choice context. Given policy-makers'
justifiable fears that choice may be used either consciously or
unconsciously to segregate schools,42 deliberate attention to the racial and
ethnic make-up of schools is necessary to avoid such an outcome. The
experience of a charter school in Verona, Wisconsin provides a case in
point. As the Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau (WLAB) noted: "Some
individuals are concerned that the admissions practices of Core
Knowledge Charter School ... were designed to minimize the number of
minority students attending the school." '428 School officials adamantly
denied the racial composition of the school was engineered, claiming
instead that it was an unexpected and even undesirable outcome given the
applications received. Administrators increased advertising efforts to
address this concern, but with a limited number of seats, and the
continuing eligibility of returning students,429 even increased numbers of
minority applicants did not significantly alter the number of minorities
admitted to the school. 3 As the WLAB concluded "the school's racial
demographics are unlikely to change significantly in the future unless the
board expands the school's enrollment, because no existing students will
be compelled to leave. "4 31
As Justice O'Connor noted in Wygant, public institutions face com-
peting vulnerabilities to challenges based on race. 32 If they take action, as
426. See EDWARD B. FisKE & HELEN F. LADD, WHEN SCHOOLS COMPETE: A CAUTIONARY
TAu 189-93 (2000) (reporting on the "increased ethnic polarization" that resulted when
New Zealand employed an open enrollment program); Lynn Schnaiberg, Charter Schools:
Choice Diversity May be at Odds, EDUC.WK. (May 10, 2000) (reporting that charter schools
that do not control student selection are increasing racial isolation in some locations).
427. See Fiske & Ladd, supra note 426.
428. Wis. LEGIS. AUDIT BuREAu, AN EVALUATION: CHARTER SCHOOL PROGRAM, 98-15, at
35 (1998).
429. Under Wisconsin statutes, both returning students and their siblings may be given
priority in charter school admissions.Wis. Stat. § 118.40.
430. Wis. LEGIS. AUDIT BUREAU, supra note 428, at 35.
431. Id. at 36.
432. Justice O'Connor wrote:"[P]ublic employers are trapped between the competing
hazards of liability to minorities if affirmative action is not taken to remedy apparent em-
ployment discrimination and liability to nonminorities if affirmative action is taken.Where
these employers, who are presumably fully aware both of their duty under federal law to
respect the rights of all their employees and of their potential liability for failing to do so,
act on the basis of information which gives them a sufficient basis for concluding that
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these ten cases illustrate, they risk challenge for improper use of race. If
they take no action, they risk challenges that they allowed racial segrega-
tion to occur by negligence or intention. Beyond these risks of litigation,
failure to act to end or forestall racial isolation abdicates responsibility for
a very real educational concern with far-reaching consequences for the
children it affects; both those chosen and those left behind.
Another factor that should be emphasized in the narrow tailoring
analysis is that these policies are less intrusive than other potential tools at
a district's disposal. 433 Nothing compels a school district to allow parents
the option to choose. That state and local authorities have attempted to
address the educational problem of racial isolation by employing volun-
tary measures speaks more to sensitivity about race than its opposite. 431
Finally, it must be underscored that the goals of these policies are
consistent with the goals of the Fourteenth Amendment. 435 The compel-
ling state interest espoused here seeks to demonstrate a respect for
individuality by constructing a learning environment best able to transmit
that message. There is an "exact connection "436 between this goal and
race-conscious student selection means because the burden has been
minimized (children are told no; not denied an education) and because
there is no stigma attached to any denial. In fact, such policies actively
seek to avoid the development of an educational stigma associated with
housing patterns. The policies employ a narrow use of race only when
necessary to reduce racial isolation and ensure as much equal educational
opportunity as possible. It is that opportunity that is the right that should
be protected.
The intricacies of our constitution, laws, and precedent allow for the
deduction of a number of rights enjoyed by citizens. As they spring from
different quarters, these rights grow in competition for influence over the
conduct of governmental policy towards individuals. In all the cases dis-
cussed, the rights of individuals have been pitted against those of an
admission policy; but truly, they are in contest with the rights of the indi-
viduals those policies attempt to help. Those policies are not so much
remedies for an unchangeable past, as they are active expressions of the
current rights of minorities to the same facilities, education, and social
remedial action is necessary, a contemporaneous findings requirement should not be nec-
essary." 476 U.S. 267, 291.
433. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
434. If not enough parents volunteer to send their children to integrated educational
environments, it also begs the policy question of what the proper response should be in
the face of consistent and persistent evidence that the benefits of integrated learning envi-
ronments far outweigh the alternative.
435. See also Brown, supra note 181,266. Mark R. Killenbeck makes this assertion with
respect to affirmative action policies in higher education admissions. Killenbeck, supra note
315.
436. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 281.
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networks as their White counterparts and of the current rights of White
and minority students to a diverse educational setting that will prepare
them for an increasingly integrated workplace.
The combination of these diverse rights of many individuals form
the compelling right of the state to permit schools to override the rights
of individuals to choose their schools. This is similar to the suspension of
the right to choose for those who fail admission to schools because of
their academic abilities. No guarantee to a neighborhood school exists to
the extent that it trumps the curricular needs of the school system, else
the one-room school would still be the rule. We sort children based on
age, ability, and disability. As the district does not have the duty to provide
each neighborhood with each grade, with each type of magnet school, or
with each step on the continuum of placement for the children with dis-
abilities, it does not have the duty to provide every individual with a
specific academic or preferred placement. If a district can take advantage
of its overall diversity by allowing all students to experience a diverse
educational setting, it has not usurped the rights of individuals to any
greater degree than it has in a host of other curricular policies, many with
less purpose than racial and ethnic diversification.
The phantom stature currently given the rights of individuals to
choose their school is more a result of a "fatal" application of strict scru-
tiny than a result of any logical balancing of the various individual rights
at the heart of the cases at hand. That one individual is allowed to scuttle
an accepted curricular goal of our society43 7 makes a mockery of those
judges that frame their rejection of these policies in the larger picture of
removing government from dictating sociological patterns."' By doing
nothing, a district does much, as is the case when it allows the sociological
patterns of the neighborhoods it serves to dictate the curricular potential
of its schools.Yet, in forcing schools to maintain the status quo of racial
isolation, judges ask schools to prepare students for the past, not for the
future. Such is in opposition to an educator's duty.
437. For example, Linda McNeil makes the point that after litigation forced Houston
Magnet schools to cease using race-conscious selection processes the program's "primary
emphasis on desegregation" was replaced by one of "academic choice" alone. LINDA M.
McNEIL, CONTRADICTIONS OF SCHOOL REFoRM: EDUCATIONAL COSTS OF STANDARDIZED
TESTING 31 (2000).
438. See David I. Levine, The Chinese American Challenge to Court-Mandated Quotas in
San Francisco's Public Schools: Notes from a (Partisan) Participant-Observer, 16 HARV. BLACK
LETTER L.J. 39 (2000) (arguing that recent court actions illuminate the myth of local con-
trol of school policy-making).
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CONCLUSION
As the above discussion indicates, race-conscious student selection
processes are a complex and controversial issue. A thorough review of the
ten cases involving race-conscious student selection processes in choice
contexts discerns several patterns. Those patterns surrounding the courts'
application of strict scrutiny, the courts' use of Supreme Court precedent
and of social science research provide a firm basis for a legal argument
that may prevail in future instances. The legal argument presents the five
assertions that (1) No child is denied an education; (2) Choice is granted
to parents as a means to a particular goal; (3) Education for success in a
diverse society is a compelling and specific curricular goal within the dis-
cretion of the legitimate policy-making authority of state and local
authorities; (4) That goal is at the center of the public elementary and
secondary educational enterprise; and (5) In today's world, conscious use
of race is necessary and narrowly tailored to that core educational goal.
Analysis of these cases suggests that districts currently employing
race-conscious student selection processes could take specific steps to re-
duce vulnerability to litigation and to bolster their chances of surviving
strict scrutiny should a challenge ensue. First, districts should carefully
review such policies and their rationales and employ race only in the most
necessary of circumstances.439 Next, districts should make findings based
on research to justify policies before the policies are challenged. In addi-
tion to the research available in existing literature, districts should conduct
specific research within the district to demonstrate the local existence of
racial isolation and the necessity for integration. Research concerning
patterns of parental choice, if choice is already offered, should also be
conducted to demonstrate the narrowness of their approach to the issue
and the inadequacy of providing choices absent racial and ethnic controls
for student assignment to schools. Likewise, policy-makers should work
evaluative components into any policy and include a provision in the pol-
icy for periodic review of the policy as a whole. These evaluative
components would suggest that the district anticipates or at least hopes
for a sunset for the conscious use of race. In other words, when evaluation
shows that the policy is no longer needed, it is repealed. District policies
should further tie the race-conscious provisions explicitly to various parts
of the curriculum in the policy and cross-reference those district docu-
ments. State statutes that require multicultural education should be
explicitly referenced and school officials should make certain that policy
goals are clearly articulated and included on all informational brochures
439. Note how the Seattle School District was complimented for its measured use of
race and history of reducing reliance on racial criteria over time. See supra note 149 and
accompanying text.
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and web sites.44 Particular attention should be paid to making explicit all
a parent chooses when they participate in the "choice" program.
It remains highly probable that further challenges to similar policies
will be forthcoming. The uneven responses of the various Courts of
Appeals illustrate the critical need for direction concerning race-
conscious practices on a national scale. To that end, the Supreme Court
may be forced to grant certiorari sometime in the future on this issue. If
and when it does, one can only hope that the Justices will fully under-
stand that in public elementary and secondary schools, all policy is
curriculum.44
Public elementary and secondary educational institutions exist for no
reason other than to transmit to students what others have learned, inspire
students to new learning, and inculcate the values held dear by our de-
mocracy. Student assignment or selection policies also teach. Schools can
either turn a blind eye to the ramifications of racial isolation and endur-
ing racial stereotypes, thereby becoming complicit in their perpetuation;
or schools can accept the mantle that has defined them as public institu-
tions since the Supreme Court's decision in Brown.They can take the steps
necessary to ensure that children's futures are not held hostage to the
racial divide that plagues our present and defined our past.
Sacrificing schools' efforts at voluntary educational integration on
the altar of judicial piety442 will unnecessarily hobble state and local pol-
icy-makers whose commitment to equal educational opportunity
demands action. It will not move us with "deliberate speed" '443 to the co-
lorblind world we envision as our goal. It will teach our children that
espoused beliefs in equality of opportunity and strength in our diversity
are merely platitudes insufficient to withstand even the most self-serving
of challenges. It will teach that we accept the world we now see and have
accepted that we are largely powerless to change it.These are reckless les-
sons that today's schools can ill afford to transmit for they abdicate an
educator's duty. In fulfillment of that duty, state and local policy-makers
must be allowed to be conscious about all aspects affecting a child's devel-
440. For example, a review of the web site materials guiding parental choices for the
Seattle School District makes no mention of the policy grounding the availability of
choices or the purposes for which the policy exists. Seattle Public Schools Enrollment
Guide for Parents and Students 2001-2002. Available at: http://inside.seattleschools.org/
SPS2Guide.pdf.
441. My thanks to David Schimmel at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst for
this simple, but elegant way of putting educational policy in its proper perspective. For a
discussion of how this principle can be put into practice when developing school rules, see
David Schimmel, Traditional Rule-Making and the Subversion of Citizenship Education, 61 Soc.
EDUc. 70 (1997).
442. See Boger, supra note 27, at 224.
443. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955).
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opment, including consciousness about race. Though we may decry its
necessity, for the time being, it is only through this conscious use of race
in the creation of learning environments that we best affect the con-
sciousness of the students charged to our care.

